. 8
( 8)

infused moral virtue to political life and authority will commence with
this most radical instance of an apparently legitimate political promo-
tion of theological virtue in Aquinas™s thought. Edward Andrew (1988;
cf. George 1993, 29, 34, 41“2) calls this Aquinas™s “imperial charity” “
which is understandable but not fully accurate. More than anything else
about Aquinas™s ethical and political thought, this illustrates the dangers
inherent in his (I have argued) fundamentally correct and enlighten-
ing expansion of moral virtue™s horizon, from properly human, politi-
cal and social excellence upward toward imitation of and union with its
divine exemplar (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). And this ethics of ascent, as
Theological Virtue and Thomistic Political Theory 229

Aquinas comprehends it, is rooted in the speci¬cs of his social and
civic foundations, the natural inclination to virtue and the properly
natural law.
Aquinas™s arguments in support of political punitive aid in enforcing
ecclesial faith commitments are twofold: regarding what is just and good
for human individuals and society; and regarding what be¬ts and bene-
¬ts the faith, the Church, and ultimately a right and grateful regard for
God himself, giver of the gift of true faith. With regard to the ¬rst, it is
critical to note that Aquinas does not argue that political society and its
authority ought to aim directly at the promotion of theological virtue,
much less attempt to require grace and charity on the part of its denizens
and penalize any lack thereof. Aquinas is clear, in On Kingship for exam-
ple, that this task exceeds what purely human, political authority rightly
can do and therefore also what it should do: “Now the higher the end to
which a government is ordained, the loftier that government is. . . . But
because a man does not attain his [ultimate, supernatural] end, which is
the possession of God, by human power but by divine “ according to the
words of the Apostle: ˜By the grace of God, life everlasting™ [Rom. 6:23] “
therefore the task of leading him to that end does not pertain to human
but to divine government” (On Kingship II.3, n. 108; cf. ST I“II 91, 4).
Politics™ highest function, as Aquinas notes in both On Kingship and ST,
and as we have seen repeatedly, is rather to promote ethically virtuous liv-
ing among the people, nobly but also realistically and moderately, for the
sake of the common good, in accord with that people™s circumstances,
culture, and condition, as well as to provide the base of physical, social,
and economic security that tends to facilitate virtuous living. Human law
can and should therefore assist humans in combatting vice and encour-
aging the cultivation of virtue; it cannot guarantee or achieve this goal
absolutely speaking, and it errs considerably when it attempts to do so.
So Aquinas cannot argue for “imperial” charity (or aristocratic, repub-
lican, democratic, or mixed charity, for that matter) as a function or
telos of temporal human law and properly political authority. Why then
does it become a matter of justice and public obligation for civil author-
ity to execute ecclesiastical penalties of the severest order? Once again,
Aquinas™s rationale seems to be twofold. One element of his argument is
in fact faith-based, although in part it should also be intelligible to non-
Christians with some familiarity with Christ™s way of life and teachings.
The New Law itself, the Law of the Gospel, is noteworthy for prescribing
no penalties in this world of bodily maiming or death for offenses against
it. The clergy are especially ministers or servants of this law of grace,
Politics, Human Law, and Transpolitical Virtue

and therefore it is not right that executions or other severe penalties be
exacted directly by Church leaders. Along the same lines, the clergy is to
minister to others in Christ™s place and indeed to act sacramentally “in the
person of Christ” (in persona Christi). But Christ himself harmed no one; he for-
gave and urged forbearance even while denouncing sin in clear terms and
warning of its eternal consequences absent repentance. Therefore, again,
clergymen cannot rightly or without risk of serious scandal engage in
acts of violence and bloodshed, however just these might otherwise be
(ST II“II 64, 4). By contrast, the power of execution and other severe
penalties deemed necessary by Aquinas for upholding the order of jus-
tice and the common good rightly resides in the whole political community
and speci¬cally in its established public authorities (I“II 90, 3, ad 2; cf.
I“II 95, 1 and II“II 11, 3).
The second supporting argument, which must in fact be ¬rst from
a properly political vantage point, is that there is an aspect of injustice
inherent in heresy and similar serious ecclesial offenses. First, a public
confession of faith establishes a bond of obligation, a duty of ¬delity ¬rst
and foremost to God, but secondly also to the whole community. As the
political community has a stake in fostering the moral virtue of ¬delity
or loyalty generally, speci¬cally with a view to promoting public peace,
the stability and ¬‚ourishing of family life based on the marriage vow,
and in the medieval context also as a basic bond of obedience to lawful
and consented-to authority, so the polity has a stake in enforcing other
solemn public promises (cf. ST II“II 88, 4; 89, 1“4; and 10, 8). The core
issue from the political point of view is moral, not strictly theological; in
Aquinas™s opinion, ¬delity, even religious ¬delity, can at times be also a
matter of social or legal justice.
Aquinas™s argument seems to presuppose additional minor premises,
such as that the common good is likely to be harmed by and indeed
requires the removal of obstinate breachers of faith, even by execution.
Since someone must do this, the sad task by necessity falls to civil author-
ity with its rightful monopoly on the intentional application of lethal
force when required by justice and the common good (cf. ST I“II 90, 3,
ad 2; 95, 1; and Hittinger 2003, 135“62). To this Goerner and Thompson
(1996) argue that the experience of centuries has shown that, from eccle-
sial as well as human, social and civic perspectives, Aquinas was much too
sanguine regarding the possibility of weeding out the cockle with no dam-
age done to the wheat. A more literal interpretation of Christ™s parabolic
injunction (to the servants, to leave the inevitable weeds in the ¬eld
with the wheat until the harvest: see Matt. 13:24“30) would have been
Theological Virtue and Thomistic Political Theory 231

much more just and bene¬cial, as well as truer. Further, Aquinas™s conclu-
sion requires persuasive theological evidence that although Jesus himself
evidently did not employ or sanction such sentencing, nor did the apos-
tles, and although many Church fathers forcefully opposed it, yet it is
not intrinsically incompatible with Christ™s teachings for such sentencing
to be employed by his earthly, ecclesial representatives. Aquinas provides
some scriptural support (mostly in the form of proof texts, e.g., in ST II“II
10, 8, s.c.) from the New Testament for this conclusion, but it is rather
scant and on the whole unpersuasive.
To shed some light on the signi¬cance and implications of Aquinas™s
theory in regard to heresy, civil law, and punishment, I will note two salient
and often overlooked features of Aquinas™s position on politics and faith.
First, it does not entail an in-principle argument that the claims of grace
or “divine justice” void those of nature, human reason, and natural law.
In the same ST II“II section on faith where Aquinas sanctions civil execu-
tion of ecclesial offenders, our theologian also argues forcefully against
the supposed justice of legally mandated, forced baptisms of the off-
spring of non-Christian parents. Earlier he had written that “the divine
law, which is a law of grace, does not do away with human law, which is a
law of natural reason” (ST II“II 10, 10; cf. I“II 91, 3“4). Now he clari¬es
an important implication: that to baptize a child against parental wishes
is “against natural justice,” for parents™ responsibility for and primary
authority over the care and upbringing of their offspring “before they
come to the use of [their own] reason” is a matter of natural law (II“II
10, 12; cf. I“II 94, 2). Along these same lines, Aquinas uncompromisingly
maintains that unbelievers who have not accepted the Gospel are “in no
way” (nullo modo) to be forced to accept the faith, which acceptance is by
its very nature a matter of divine gift and free personal response; it is not
a matter for social and civic intervention on the part of concerned oth-
ers in the community. Once the free act of faith has occurred, however,
the social virtue of ¬delity or faithfulness comes into play, and so compul-
sion is legitimated according also to human and natural justice: “On the
other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the
faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates; such should be
submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may ful¬ll what they have
promised, and hold what they, at one time, received” (II“II 10, 8, emphasis
The second item worthy of note is the central role Aquinas™s theory
of the common good plays in his assessment of the full meaning and
import of in¬delity, and speci¬cally heresy. The heretic and the unfaithful
Politics, Human Law, and Transpolitical Virtue

person generally do not realize, or perhaps do not want to realize, that in
important respects regarding the human social and civic community, and
absolutely speaking in relationship to God and the universal community
under his care, they are parts of a whole rather than autonomous, free-
standing individuals, naturally social creatures whose actions very often if
not always impact others. Heretics in particular prefer their own wisdom
to the shared doctrinal patrimony of the ecclesial community; they “hold
obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the universal
church” (ST II“II 2, 6, ad 3), “choos[ing] not what Christ really taught,
but the suggestions of [their] own mind” (II“II 11, 1). This faith really is
a good sharable and shared by “learned” and “simple” alike, no more the
property of the one than of the other.
But if all Church members are sharers in this faith, regardless of their
intellectual or social roles, not all are equally obligated to hold to the
faith according to Aquinas. This may seem strange, given that all who
have received and professed the faith are seriously obliged to safeguard it
in ¬delity. Aquinas argues, however, that those who are learned or socially
privileged are especially bound not to forsake this common good for the
sake of their intellectual independence, but ought, on the contrary, to
grow in their knowledge of the truths of faith and “believe them more
explicitly” (ST II“II 2, 6). Because of their insubstitutable social role as
teachers for those with less opportunity or inclination for study, theolo-
gians and all the highly educated have a special responsibility toward the
supernatural (we might call it) or the ecclesial common good, even as
those with special intellectual or moral aptitudes or other disproportion-
ate advantages are by nature intended and obliged to employ them to bene¬t
other individuals and the whole social polity as well (cf. I, 96, 4 with II“II
2, 6 and 7, and II“II 10, 7).
Here I think we ¬nd the deepest source of Aquinas™s immoderate artic-
ulations regarding the necessity of “delivering” unrepentant heretics “to
the secular tribunal, to be exterminated from the world by death” (ST
II“II 11, 3).2 Care for the common good requires care for the whole com-
munity and for all its members, in a special way care for the weakest,
the least advantaged, and those most vulnerable to injustice. Aquinas™s

2 While Aquinas™s own society in¬‚icted the death penalty for many crimes “ Aquinas men-
tions forgery among other offenses “ Aquinas™s judgment on the heretics is pronounced
in especially harsh terms. While many if not all of these uses of the death penalty may
well strike contemporary readers as immoderate, the severity of Aquinas™s language of
condemnation stands out especially when he speaks of heretics who repeatedly turn a
deaf ear to admonishment and publicly preach their errors to simple souls.
Theological Virtue and Thomistic Political Theory 233

particular concern for the poor, the “simple,” and the uneducated is
shown in virtually all his writings. Heretics from among the learned tend
especially to take advantage of their greater practice at subtle discrimi-
nations and their more extensive study of the ¬ne points of doctrine to
sway the simple over to their opinions and corrupt the faith (see II“II 2,
6, ad 2, and 11, 3). They do exactly the opposite of what they ought, out
of pride in their own intellectual excellence, and harm the community
rather than build it up through their learning.
In very different ways and in very different books, G. K. Chesterton
and Jean-Pierre Torrell both call our attention to Aquinas™s oft-hidden
natural trait of spiritedness or irascibility.3 Since it is near the end of a
rather long book and the reader may, like the writer, be nodding, rather
than reproduce Torrell™s erudite expression, I will quote instead some
of Chesterton™s amusing yet penetrating prose: “Being himself resolved
to argue, to argue honestly, to answer everybody, to deal with everything,
[Aquinas] produced books enough to sink a ship or stock a library, though
he died in comparatively early middle age. Probably he could have not
done it at all, if he had not been thinking even when he was not writing;
but above all thinking combatively. This, in his case, certainly did not mean
bitterly or spitefully or uncharitably; but it did mean combatively” (1956,
126; emphasis in the original). The generally placid surface of the ST and
Aquinas™s many other works, together with the passion for truth rather
than for publicity or self-expression that clearly animates them, tend to
obscure this thumotic feature of Aquinas™s psyche, but occasionally it
emerges beyond mistake. Chesterton recounts for us one such instance:
Aquinas™s angry exhortation to Siger of Brabant and other contempo-
raries not to “challenge what [Aquinas had] written . . . in some corner
nor before children who are powerless to decide such dif¬cult matters. Let him
reply openly if he dare. He shall ¬nd me there confronting him, and
not only my negligible self, but many another whose study is truth. We
shall do battle with his errors or bring a cure to his ignorance” (94,
quoting from the conclusion of Aquinas™s De Unitate Intellectus; emphasis
It therefore seems highly likely, in the case we have been consider-
ing, that Aquinas™s spiritedness was greatly aroused against heretics and
apostates from the universities and upper echelons of society, who in

3 As Torrell (1996) notes, the rarity of clear revelations of these traits in Aquinas™s writings
must indicate a remarkable lifetime™s effort at self-control and moderation in order better
to direct the forces of his mind, will, and passions to the service of God and neighbor.
Politics, Human Law, and Transpolitical Virtue

their pride confused others, especially the simple, to the detriment of
the common good. In this rare instance, his unchecked spiritedness led
Aquinas to endorse in unusually immoderate terms an unjust and unwise
ecclesial-political policy. In the spirit of Aquinas™s study of Aristotle, how-
ever, there seem to me at least two strong resources from Thomistic theory
as we have considered it that could have helped guide Aquinas™s discourse
on the uses of political power and ecclesial enforcement to a different and
happier conclusion. These are, ¬rst, his important distinction between
infused and acquired ethical virtue as they relate to political virtue and
the human common good; and, second, his exhortation to balance great-
ness of soul with humility in religious, social, and civic affairs, and indeed
in human life generally.

9.2 Infused Moral Virtue and Civic Legal Justice
In ST I“II 63, 4, Aquinas distinguishes the virtues that humans acquire
according to their nature, and by dint of habituation in daily life, from
the infused moral virtues that are a gift of God accompanying grace, and
at the service of supernatural love or charity (caritas). These virtues may
have the same names “ fortitude, temperance, liberality, and the like “
but they are speci¬cally different habits. In other words, infused virtues
are not just acquired ethical virtues given by God miraculously without
any human effort, nor are acquired virtues infused virtues earned “the
American way,” by dint of hard work; they are different habits altogether,
although they perfect the same faculties of the human soul (I“II 63, 4
ad 3). The mean of virtue is ¬xed according to a different “rule,” in the
one case human reason, in the other the “Divine rule.” So, for instance,
acquired temperance normally leads a person to eat just what is needed by
the body, but infused temperance might in the same circumstances rather
¬nd the mean in fasting. These habits also differ in the ends or goals
to which they direct human affections and action. In the course of his
exposition, Aquinas formulates this teleological or purposive distinction
in speci¬cally political terminology, citing and paraphrasing Aristotle™s
second foundational text from the Politics: “The other speci¬c difference
among habits [in addition to that derived from their rule and mean] is
taken from the things to which they are directed; for a man™s health and a
horse™s are not of the same species, on account of the difference between
the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same
sense, the Philosopher says (Pol. III.3) that citizens have diverse virtues
according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In
Theological Virtue and Thomistic Political Theory 235

the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby human beings
behave well in respect of their being ˜fellow citizens with the saints, and
of the household of God™ (Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues,
whereby a human being behaves well in respect of human affairs” (I“II
63, 4).
With the infused virtue of ¬delity, then, a human being is inclined to
ful¬ll loyally his or her obligations toward God and the “city of God.”
This mean and the act (for example, holding steadfastly to the faith
received and professed) of this virtue will not be the same as an act
of ¬delity on purely human, social and civic terms (e.g., keeping one™s
word to appear in court or loyally honoring one™s wedding vows). These
are founded on premises that do not presuppose grace, although grace
may well reinforce one™s noble human or rational reasons for ¬delity
and so elevate a noble social and civic act to the supernatural plane. So
Aquinas argues that martyrdom comprises, beyond death speci¬cally on
account of one™s faith, also laying down one™s life for any “honest” human
good (love of one™s neighbor, for example, or devotion to justice “ when
this is done voluntarily and ultimately for love of God, the creator and
sustainer of all human goods). “The good of one™s country is paramount
among human goods,” writes Aquinas, “yet the divine good, which is the
proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than any human good.
Nevertheless, since human good may become divine, for instance when it
is referred to God, it follows that any human good, insofar as it is referred
to God, may be the cause of martyrdom” (ST II“II 124, 5, ad 3).
But it makes no sense to order the infused act of ¬delity, fully intelligi-
ble only on the basis of supernatural faith, revelation, and the divine good,
to the social and civic, or human common good simply. On Aquinas™s own
analogy of civil regimes, the political enforcement of divinely infused
virtue seems about as intelligible as expecting an oligarchy to enforce an
ordinance of justice legislated for an aristocracy or a monarchy (cf. ST
I“II 92, 1). The diversity between human and divine polities in Aquinas™s
own thought runs deeper than his arguments for political involvement in
repressing religious in¬delity might suggest. “Man [homo] is not ordained
to the political community according to all that he is and all that he has;
and so it should not be that every action of his acquires merit or demerit
in relation to the political community. But all that man is, and is able to
do, and has, must be referred to God, and therefore every human action,
whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit [habet rationem meriti vel
demeriti] in the sight of God, from the very essence of that act” (I“II 21,
4, ad 3).
Politics, Human Law, and Transpolitical Virtue

9.3 Thomistic and Aristotelian Moderation for the Common Good
In explicating the nature of Christian faith, Aquinas writes that the knowl-
edge faith imparts is in itself more certain than the knowledge of the sci-
ences or intellectual virtues, since it is revealed by God, who is all-knowing
and truthful. To us, however, or from a subjective human perspective, the
knowledge of faith is less uncertain, since the supernatural mysteries it
professes exceed the capacity of the human mind (ST II“II 4, 8). Keep-
ing this distinction in mind, again it seems most incongruous to employ
human law and authority in punishing lapses from faith. Perhaps more
humility would have helped moderate Aquinas™s indignation, his com-
bativeness in this instance, to enable him to take the perspective of the
human subject of faith into greater account, vis-` -vis human or political
life and law, as well as the complexity of motivation on any given person™s
part. For although Aquinas™s humility is a moral virtue, it is premised
on an intellectual awareness of the distinction between God™s knowledge
and power, and our own fallibility and ¬nitude. Aquinas himself notes,
with regard to toleration of non-Jewish or non-Christian religious rites,
that moderation in repressing what one judges to be absolute religious
error may better serve to reveal charity and attract others to faith over
time through patient persuasion.4 He also cites, as an objection to his
argument, a passage from the New Testament that counsels modesty in
admonishing the wayward faithful; but he ¬nds that this is suf¬ciently
provided for by the ¬rst and second warnings of error customary before
proceeding to sentencing.
If in this particular regard we ¬nd Aquinas™s modesty or moderation
somewhat lacking, in numerous other ways that matter to politics this
virtue abounds in Aquinas™s thought. Regarding property, for instance,
there are Aquinas™s nuanced arguments that material goods should ben-
e¬t all and that possessions should be privately owned for the most part
but readily shared. In this he echoes Aristotle™s theory of property, a
moderate alternative to possessive individualism, on the one hand, and
to the Republic™s prima facie case for communism, on the other. Yet in
Aquinas™s argument there is also the metaphysical awareness of being
part of a universal community, a cosmopolis founded and governed by the
creator, and having a broader, more common view of property™s original

4 Aquinas™s humility as a virtue is related to the more general virtue of modesty, which in
turn is related to the more “principal,” cardinal virtue of temperance or moderation. For
an insightful treatment of “Aquinas™s Novel Modesty” and its political import, see Foley
Theological Virtue and Thomistic Political Theory 237

destination and meaning than that conveyed by Aristotle in the Ethics
or Politics. Moreover, there is an invocation of duty and conscience that
does not factor into Aristotle™s portrayal of the good and the best vis-` -vis
possessions. Finally, there is the reminder to consciences of the needs
of the poor, especially the poor close at hand but also anyone in severe
need whom one could assist. This social ethic at the very least goes well
beyond the ethos of Aristotle™s proposed ambit of sharing (with “friends
and clubmates”) and with his occasional pragmatic observation that sen-
sible, well-to-do citizens ought to make sure that the poor have means of
support and learn an honest trade, lest their neglect come back to haunt
them. The order and welfare of the polis is the horizon for Aristotle™s
Politics, whereas the polis (or province, or nation) is for Aquinas situated
in the heart of humanity and of the universe. This brings the individual
person who is not a philosopher closer to the origin and end of the uni-
verse, and more deeply into his or her own interiority to ask, religiously
but also politically, how shall I live? From the perennial foundation of
politics in our common humanity and also from the exigencies of our
own globalized, modernized, yet still faith-¬lled era, Aquinas™s account
of the purposes of politics, and the possibilities of virtue and the common
good, merits further study and re¬‚ection even by those who do not share
his religious faith.
The coexistence in the twentieth century of unprecedented techno-
logical prowess and acute moral and civic poverty suggests the need to go
beyond merely social or human “ to say nothing of political “ moderation
if we are to safeguard that very moderation, speak to deeper aspirations of
the heart, and offer an attractive alternative to ethical utopianism. In this
respect, the facts, the phenomena of our own moral and political experi-
ence, validate Thomistic humility, or something quite like it, and suggest
that Aristotelian moderation (which we would also do well to keep) alone
cannot suf¬ce, either in theory or in practice. Chesterton once remarked
that “Aristotle had described the magnanimous man who is great and
knows that he is great. But Aristotle would never have recovered his own
greatness, but for the miracle that created the more magnanimous man,
who is great and knows that he is small” (1956, 90). Even those who
argue that Aquinas™s glosses impeded Aristotle from recovering his full
greatness in ethics and political thought might consider that especially
in an era with its remarkable advances in technology and human power,
a rediscovery of a viable humility may prove a necessary precondition for
achieving wonder and reinvigorating philosophy and political philosophy
as Aristotle understood them. Aristotle remains tremendously important
Politics, Human Law, and Transpolitical Virtue

to political theory, but Aquinas merits his place too, and his occasional
mis¬re or immoderate judgment should not put us off. In the melding
of humility into both philosophic and political forms of “ruling virtue,”
Aquinas offers a powerful example of revelation aiding reason, breaking
new ground for theoretical advances that many may ¬nd persuasive.
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adoration, 161 174, 186, 192. See also Jaffa,
adultery, 180 Harry
Ambler, Wayne, 20 tendentious glosses ( Jenkins),
Ambrose, 132 74, 110“11
analytic political thought, 29“56. See second political-philosophic
also Galston, Rawls, Sandel foundation. See common
Andrew, Edward, 228“9 good, regime particularity
antonomasia. See Aquinas, Thomas: third political-philosophic
relation to Aristotle foundation. See natural law
Apel, Karl-Otto, 13 antonomasia, 71
Aquinas, Thomas Aristotle insuf¬ciently
citation patterns and dating of theological, 138
exposure to Aristotle™s Politics, Aristotle
contemporary appropriations of,
64, 69, 74“7
citation patterns of Nicomachean 21, 34, 39, 48, 60“2, 71,
Ethics, 69 89
commentaries as sententia or ¬rst political-philosophic
foundation. See social and
expositio, 73
civic, human nature as
Commentary on Aristotle™s
“Nicomachean Ethics,” 63, 68, relation to Aquinas. See Aquinas,
second political-philosophic
Commentary on Aristotle™s “Politics,”
foundation. See regime
18, 63, 64, 68, 77
¬rst political-philosophic particularity
foundation. See social and third political-philosophic
civic, human nature as foundation. See best regime
Arnhart, Larry, 144, 168
On Kingship, 64
relation to Aristotle, 15“16, 18, 19, Augustine
and Aquinas™s natural law, 108
20, 70“4, 102“15, 164, 166,


Augustine (cont.) and legal justice, 181, 185, 186
moderation of political ambition, and magnanimity, 154
and naturally social and civic
political vs. contemplative life, human nature. See social and
civic, human nature as
truth and wisdom as common and need for law, 212
goods, 67 and polity preservation, 54“6
unjust law as “no law at all,” 192 Aristotle™s limited focus upon, 20
Averroes, 68 as con¬‚icting with a private good,
as the Commentator, 71“2 120“4
as either domesic, civic, universal,
Berlin, Isaiah. See also Galston, or divine, 121
William common and good dimensions, 4,
value pluralism, 21, 32, 48, 49“51 12, 14, 15
best regime dominant end vs. unitary but
Aquinas™s deemphasis of, 64 complex theories
Aristotle™s third (MacIntyre), 14
political-philosophic human, moral, or natural common
foundation, 61 good, 188, 191, 197, 198
mixed regime, 64 link to individual good, 82, 131
nonexistence of, 91, 101 man not fully ordained to political
Bush, George, 222 community, but to God,
cardinal virtues. See virtues metaphysical foundations, 16. See
charity, 98, 130, 193 foundations
imperial charity (Edward Andrew), self-transcendent goals necessary
for self-ful¬llment, 149
Chesterton, G. K., 233, 237 sense in which it has priority, 82
Christian vs. pagan ethics. See religion the end of law, 212“13
vs. religious extremism, 10“12
Cicero, 132, 153, 175, 220
vs. utilitarianism, 6, 12“14, 24
honors, political vs. contemplative
communitarianism. See Sandel,
life, 135“6
citizenship. See regime particularity
conscience, 24, 103, 169, 194
patriotic self-sacri¬ce, 123
contemplation, 101
civic, human nature as. See social and
contemplative and practical lives,
civic, human nature as
135“6, 150
civil disobedience, 131, 196, 205
Copleston, Frederick, 166
Clinton, Bill, 222
cosmopolis, 101, 103, 121, 187, 236
coercion. See law
custom. See natural law
Collins, Susan, 73, 144, 173, 174,
175, 196, 197, 198
Decalogue (Ten Commandments)
common good, 3“28. See also
and natural law, 189
and natural law, legal justice,
and concern for all, including the
poor, 156
dependence, 143
and just vs. unjust regime types, 18
Aristotle vs. Aquinas, 166
and justice, 19, 100
Index 251

knowledge of ¬nitude and comprehensive, not freestanding,
dependence leading to approach (Rawls), 31
reverence, 167 criticism of, 54“6
virtues of acknowledged discussion of Liberal Pluralism, 54“6
dependence (MacIntyre), 25, “expressive liberty,” 52
polity preservation and common
144, 172
duty, 186 good, 54“6
always relational, non-Kantian, public accomodation of moral and
religious worldviews, 52
unimportance of foundations, 32,
equity, 179, 190, 213 49“51, 53. See also foundations
Etzioni, Amitai, 41 generosity, 224
external goods. See magnanimity George, Robert, 216
discussion of his critique of
faith, 130 MacIntyre™s moral
family. See also social and civic, particularism, 216“20
human nature as discussion of Making Men Moral,
¬rst and most natural association, 205“8
78, 82 Glendon, Mary Ann, 8
its dignity and relation to city, 81 Goerner, Edward, 218, 227, 230
Ferree, William, 175 gratitude, 25, 156“8
¬rst principles, 23. See foundations Thanksgiving holiday, 220“2
contrast of Aquinas™s use of Gray, John, 51
Aristotle™s speculative vs.
pratical, 103, 108“9 Hart, H. L. A., 56, 211
Fischer, David Hackett, 221 minimum content of natural law,
Fortin, Ernest, 3, 101, 129, 132, 54
195 society not a suicide club or pact,
fortitude, 127, 153 38, 54
foundations, 19, 88, 189. See also ¬rst Havel, V´ clav, 144, 171“2
principles, natural law, Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 13
religion, Sandel, Michael Hobbes, Thomas, 96
alleged unimportance of, 21, 32, Holloway, Carson, 144, 163, 165
49“51. See also Galston, honors, 124, 126, 127, 146, 149
William hope, 130, 151, 168
justice necessary for true virtues, Horner, David, 144, 148, 151, 153,
197 162, 163, 165
necessity of, 22 humility, 25, 98, 140, 143, 155, 172,
friendship, 155, 156, 169, 170 228, 236“8
and Aristotle™s temperance,
Galston, William, 21, 31“2, 54“6. See 164
also Berlin, Isaiah as complement to magnanimity,
appeal to Hart, 54 160, 197“8
Aristotle™s natural right, 21, 48 as more a moral virtue than a
Aristotle™s virtues of theological virtue, 162, 164
regime-preservation, 61, as principally an infused virtue,
89 163

inclinations, natural, 188. See also will King, Martin Luther, Jr., 131
for happiness, 118 Kraynak, Robert, 6
need for and inclination toward Kries, Douglas, 3, 167
society. See social and civic,
human nature as law. See also morals legislation
toward good in general, 109, 118, and coercion, 214, 220
de¬ned, 187, 205
169, 196
toward virtue. See natural law precepts vs. commandments,
Jaffa, Harry, 20, 103, 147, 150, Lincoln, Abraham, 220, 222
love. See charity
166“7, 168, 169, 217. See also
Aquinas, relation to Aristotle
autonomy of practical life, 150 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 143, 154, 169
discussion of Thomism and dominant end vs. unitary but
complex theories, 14
George™s critique of his moral
Jenkins, John, 72, 73“4, 111, 114, 115 particularism, discussed,
Jesus of Nazareth, Christ, 97, 159
virtues of acknowledged
justice. See also justice, legal or
dependence, 25, 144, 172
magnanimity, 25, 140, 155,
akin to charity, 193
143“72. See also gratitude,
and common good. See common
good, and justice
and common goods, 154
and ¬delity, 230“1
and concern for all, including the
de¬ned, 173, 176, 181, 223
poor, 156
foundation for true virtues,
and ingratitude, 148, 152“8
and social human nature, 154,
in most contemporary political
thought, 173
as complement to humility, 160,
its potential parts, 223
preeminence of, 196, 212
de¬ned, 145, 146
the will its proper subject, 182
paradoxical concern and contempt
justice, legal or general, 138, 140,
for external goods, 147“51
magni¬cence, 149
and common good, 181, 185,
McInerny, Ralph, 17, 21
merit and demerit, 129
and Decalogue, natural law, 190
mixed regime. See best regime:
and natural law, 25, 183, 189
mixed regime
and social and civic environment,
moderation. See temperance
175, 191
de¬ned, 25, 144
etymology of, 217
preeminence of, 196, 212
morals legislation, 105, 203“25
justice, social. See social justice
Aquinas™s approach, 26“8, 81,
Kantianism, 13, 42, 67, 124, 216,
as blunt instrument, 216,
of Rawls, 38, 40, 43
Index 253

as familial but reinforced more natural sociability. See social and civic,
broadly, 221 human nature as
broadly legal, noncoercive natural theology, 167. See also religion
varieties, 224“5 nature and grace. See religion
inadequacy of parental Nazi Germany, 13
admonitions alone, 211 neutrality, 26
limited, 217, 219
public vs. private dichotomy, Origen, 163
125“30 Orwell, George, 13
rejection of all varieties, 12 Ostwald, Martin, 175
two pedagogies, for good and bad
persons, 203“25 pagan vs. Christian ethics. See religion
tyrannical varieties, 4, 10“12 particularism, moral, 216“20
Paul, Apostle, 98, 154, 159
natural inclinations. See inclinations, Pieper, Josef, 151
natural and Nazi Germany, 13
natural law, 117. See also religion, Plato, 134
foundations, cosmopolis, and and psychological basis of justice,
justice, legal or general 181
and Decalogue, legal justice, individuals™ need for society, 78
189 Thrasymachus on justice, 178
and legal justice, 183, 189, Plotinus, 134, 135
190 political, human nature as. See social
Aquinas™s third and civic, human nature as
political-philosophic practical and contemplative lives,
foundation, 61, 101, 102“10 135“6, 150
based on unchangeable essence of practical wisdom. See prudence
human nature, 112 pride, 227. See also humility
conscience, 24, 169, 194 property, 237. See also social justice
determination and completion by privately owned, common in use,
human law, 194, 214, 217, 123, 156, 236
218 prudence (practical wisdom,
and signi¬cance of social custom prudentia), 185, 197
and habituation, 220, 225 pusillanimity, 151, 154, 169
inherently religious dimension,
193“4 Raphael, 28
legal vs. illegal laws, 192, 205 rational, human nature as, 194
metaphysics not foremost teacher sense of and conversation about
of ethics, 169 good and bad, just and unjust.
natural inclination to virtue, 82“3, See social and civic, human
102“10, 117, 192 nature as
synderesis, 24, 103, 169 Rawls, John, 21, 30, 60, 86, 173. See
vs. natural right, 115, 124, 138, also social and civic, human
192“4, 218 nature as, and Sandel,
natural right Michael: criticism of Rawls
vs. natural law, 115, 124, 138, against dominant end theory, 6,
192“4, 218 14

Rawls, John (cont.) integration with philosophy and
Aristotelian Principle of politics, 3, 15, 20, 68, 166,
motivation, 34, 39 174, 199
Aristotle™s sense of just and unjust, intolerance and oppression, 27“8,
62 204
common human nature as free limits of unassisted reason, 120
and equal moral persons, 40 man not fully ordained to political
criticism of, 37“41 community, but to God,
difference principle, 32 128“30
discussion of A Theory of Justice, merit and demerit, 129, 160
nature and grace, 68, 98
¬‚ourishing of diverse life plans, 35 need for transpolitical dimension
instrumental rationality, 38 or horizon, 4, 28, 66, 96, 136,
Kantianism, 38, 40, 43 172, 199, 237“8
principle of inclusiveness, 34 possibilities of unassisted reason,
priority of right over good, 36, 37 167
the excellences, 39 problems of particularity and
the social nature of mankind, 33 extremism, 6, 10“12
Reagan, Ronald, 222 religious legislation, 223
reason role of clergy, 230
limits if unassisted, 120 self-emptying (kenosis), divine and
possibilities if unassisted, 167 human, 166
regime particularity, 87“102, 225. See will to be conformed to God, 119
also common good, and reverence, 167
jusice, legal or general rights, 9
Aristotle™s overemphasis upon, 19 excessive emphasis upon, 5“8
Aristotle™s second helpfulness of, 6“7, 14
political-philosophic Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 96, 110, 123
foundation, 61
citizens™ virtue vs. human virtue, Sandel, Michael, 9, 21, 30“41, 60,
23, 90“1, 94“6, 102, 195“6 86
need for best regime, 91 Aristotle™s best regime, 61“2
citizenship de¬ned, 90, 91“3 community™s claims over
regime types, 18, 184 individuals, 45
religion. See natural law, foundations criticism of, 45“8
adoration, 161 criticism of Rawls, 32“3, 42“5
and Aristotelian contemplation, defense of Rawls™s difference
principle, 43“5
and natural law, 193“4 discussion of Liberalism and the
Christian vs. pagan ethics, 96“9, Limits of Justice, 41“8
distancing from
115, 138, 143“4, 154, 163,
communitarianism, 42, 61
¬delity and justice, 230“1 enlarged self and constitutive
gratitude and prayer publicly community, 33, 43, 44
encouraged, 221“2 inadequate epistemological
human nature as religious, 194 approach and foundations,
infused virtues, 188, 226, 234“5 30, 41
Index 255

science Taliban, 10“11
allegedly undermined by Aquinas™s temperance
position, 169 and humility, 164
self-emptying (kenosis). See religion Tessitore, Aristide, 198
self-suf¬ciency. See social and civic, Thanksgiving holiday, 220“2
human nature as theological virtues. See virtues; see also
Seneca, 157“8 faith, hope, charity
servanthood. See slavery Thompson, Walter, 227, 230
Shanley, Brian, 195 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 7, 9
Siger of Brabant, 68 toleration. See religion
slavery. See also religion: Christian vs. Torrell, Jean-Pierre, 68, 73, 75, 111,
pagan ethics 138, 233
and servanthood, 96“9, 160, 161, Tully. See Cicero
natural slavery, 78 utilitarianism
social and civic, human nature as, 22, vs. common good, 6, 12“14, 24
194. See family, Rawls, John
and common good, 9, 212, 214 virtues
and magnanimity, 154, 155 Aquinas™s classi¬cation, 132
and need for law, 212 cardinal, 140
as ¬rst political-philosophic cardinal or human virtues as
foundation, 67“70, 85“6, 89 chie¬‚y political virtues, 134“5,
communal self-suf¬ciency, 78“9, 159, 175, 195
Christian ethics considers virtues
natural slavery, 78 chie¬‚y as leading to God,
need for and inclination toward 163
society, 78 infused, 188, 204, 226, 234“5
political community quali¬edly political, cleansing, of already
natural, associational not cleansed soul, and exemplar
organic, 23, 60, 77, 81, 85“6 virtues, 134“6
sense of and conversation about theological, 130, 226
good and bad, just and unjust,
Walesa, Lech, 172
62, 65, 80“1
social justice, 97, 156, 224. See also Walzer, Michael, 55“6
property war, just
Soviet Union, 13, 171 noncombatant immunity, 55“6
speech, as distinctly human Washington, George, 220, 222, 225
sense of and conversation about Weisheipl, James, 132
good and bad, just and unjust. will, 118. See also inclinations, natural
See social and civic, human principle of properly human
nature as action, 196
Strauss, Leo, 20, 103 signi¬cance of freedom, 218“19
the proper subject of justice, 182
summum bonum, 16
to be conformed to God, 119
summum malum, 16
wisdom, 130
synderesis, 24, 103, 112, 169


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