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Act of Revocation (Great Britain), autocracies
chaos and, 114
activism, civil rights and, 195 under social choice theory, 109
autocrats. See also dictators
activism, political party,
model for, 178“182 Ballader, Eduoard, 216
public perception from, Bank of the U.S., Hamilton and, 55,
177“178 127“128, 127
Adams, John, 79, 96, 108 Bank of England, 17, 18, 34, 52
Adams, John Quincy, 137 “belief aggregation,” 254
Adams, Samuel, 96 belief cascades, 85, 104, 145, 158
“The Address at Cooper Institute” in game theory, 265
(Lincoln), 155 Wall Street crash as, 224
“anarchic philosophers,” 208 Bell, John, 158
Anne (Queen), 18, 54 Benton, Thomas Hart, 148
apex games, 48 Blair, Montgomery, 148
“architects of change,” 21, 24, Blow, Elizabeth, 146
Blow, Peter, 146
Madison as, 108 Blow, Taylor, 149
aristocracies, under social choice theory, Bonaparte, Napoleon, 7, 36, 79
Brahe, Tycho, 230
Arrow, Kenneth brain, models for, 263
Social Choice and Individual Values, Breckenridge, John, 158
Bretton Woods System, 21, 31, 216, 220
Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 260 Smithsonian Agreement and, 207
Arrow™s Impossibility Theorem, 22, 244, Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, 243, 256
Bryan, William Jennings, 19, 63, 164,
246, 257
dictators under, 246 186
asset markets, 204 Buchanan, James, 148
“Atlantic Constitution,” 16, 200, 201, Bull Moose Progressive Party, 186, 187
Bush, George W., 177, 240
208, 211, 214, 229
Great Britain and, 16 Byrnes, James, 236
Keynes on, 206
transformations in, 213, 222 CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), EU
Attila, 7 and, 10


Lettres d™une bourgeois de New
capitalism, 24
Caritat, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas. See Haven, 122
Condorcet, Marquis de Madison in¬‚uenced by, 120“125
catastrophes, 262 Social Mathematics, 121
Chamberlain, Joseph, 65 social truth for, 252“256
Congress, U.S. See also Continental
“Tariff Reform” of, 65
chaos. See also chaos theory, social Congress
autocracies and, 114 “cloture” and, 9
avoidance of, 115, 116 Continental, core beliefs of, 72
mathematical, 3 factions within, 8
in polity, 4, 46 “gridlock” in, 8
prophets of, 16, 21, 202, 207“212 mutability of, 8
in social choice theory, 3“11 Conservative Party, 65“66
theory, social, 4, 5, 6, 201 Thatcher and, 66
war as, 6 Constitutional Convention, Franklin at,
chaos hypothesis, 263 132“134
chaos theory, social, 4, 5, 6, 201 constitutional quandary, 16
voting and, 100 of 1944, 228“233, 231
constitutions. See also “Atlantic
Charles I (King), 49
Charles II (King), 49, 50, 51 Constitution”; constitutional
Charles V (King), 34 quandary; Constitution, U.S.
Chicago Press and Tribune, 152, “Atlantic,” 16, 200, 201, 208, 211,
153 214, 229
China, economic growth in, 24“25 “Girondin,” 253
Christian Democratic Party. See DC language as part of, 209
Churchill, Winston, 224 under social choice theory, 113“117
Civil Rights Act (U.S.), 168, 194 Constitution, U.S.
Democratic Party and, 189, 190 core beliefs of, 98, 104
civil rights activism. See activism, civil evolution of, 16
rights rati¬cation of, 98“100
Civil War (U.S.), 21 Continental Congress
causes of, 61 core beliefs of, 72
Clay, Henry, 137 declarations and resolves of, 90“93
Cleveland, Grover, 172 core beliefs, 10, 15, 98
Clinton, Bill, 192“194 during 1860 election, 144
“cloture,” 9 of U.S. constitution, 98, 104
collegium, 5, 7, 113 Corn Laws (Great Britain), 18, 64
semi, 48, 51, 57 Cornwallis, Charles, 59
commodities markets, 204 Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville,
Common Agricultural Policy. See CAP Joseph, 117
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 15, 22, 68, Crittenden Resolution (U.S.), 145
Cromwell, Oliver, 45, 49, 50, 115
107, 254, 271, 273“275
Condorcet, Marquis de, 68 “culture wars,” 183
Esquisse d™un tableau historique des
Progr` s de l™´ sprit humain, 111,
e e Davis, Jefferson, 141
DC (Christian Democratic Party), in
121, 125, 253
Essai sur l™application de l™analyse a la Italy, 27
probabilit´ des d´ cisions rendues
e e decidability-halting problem, 243
a la pluralit´ des voix, 15, 110,
e Declaration of Independence (U.S.), 21,
111, 121 58, 94“97, 115
Jefferson in¬‚uenced by, 120“125 Jefferson and, 115


quandary of, 73“79 1860, 142, 158“163
signers of, 96“97 models for, 266“267, 268“273
Declaration of Indulgence (Great 1972, 199
Britain), 51 1968, 198
Declaration of the Rights of Man and 1964, 197
the Citizen, 123 partisan alignment and, 129
de¬‚ation, in Japan, 43 presidential candidates, policy
democracies, 24 positions of (1976“2000), 193
logic of, 29“30 race as factor in, 168
republics v., 1“2 “social preference cycles” during, 145
under social choice theory, 109 electoral college (U.S.), 68“69
Democratic Party (U.S.) Emerson, John, 146
Civil Rights Act and, 189, 190 empires
¬‚anking moves of, 179 French, 35“36
policy shifts of, 187, 188 Ottoman, 35
Whig Party v., 137“140 equilibrium theory, 231, 255
Descartes, Rene, Discourse on Method, ERP (European Recovery Program),
252 237
EU (European Union). See also France;
dictators, 5
under Arrow™s Impossibility Theorem, Germany; Great Britain; Italy;
dangers of, 32 CAP and, 10
“disaffected” voters, 184, 196 economic issues within, 28
Disraeli, Benjamin, 64 PR in, 69
Dixiecrat Party, 189 risk aversion within, 10“11
European Recovery Program. See ERP
Dole, Robert, 172
Douglas, Stephen, 61, 85, 138, 140“141, Everett, Edward, 158
150, 158, 163. See also 1860 evolutionary game theory. See game
election (U.S.) theory, evolutionary
debates, with Lincoln, 151“153,
“factionalism,” 59
Dred Scott v. Irene Emerson, 147 federalism, Riker on, 101
Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford, Federalist Papers (Hamilton/Jay/
Madison), 105
II, 110
consequences of, 143, 145
IX, 33
Dumas, Charles-Guillaume-Frederic, 77
X, 2, 6, 9, 15, 33, 59, 61, 104, 105,
“economic equilibrium hypothesis,” 202 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115,
economic markets. See also asset 120, 122, 123, 129, 130, 131, 163,
markets; commodities markets 270, 271
XI, 33, 116
regulation of, 214, 241
XIV, 106
Egnal, Mark, 74
XLIII, 163
1860 election (U.S.), 142, 158“163
electorate core beliefs during, 144
LI, 33, 59, 116, 122, 131
National Union Party during, 158
LXII, 114
schematic representation of, 144
LXVII, 131
Einstein, Albert
Federalist Party (U.S.), 138. See also
Annus Mirabilis of, 258“260
Eldridge, Gerry, 96 Whig Party (U.S.)
elections, U.S., 62, 139. See also 1860 Republicans v., 17, 112“113, 125“128,
election 138


Filmer, Robert Goldsmith, Oliver, 111
The Natural Power of Kings Defended The Deserted Village, 111
against the Unnatural Liberty of Goldwater, Barry, 177, 190
the People, 251 “Gamble” of, 191
Observations Concerning the Origins Great Britain
of Government, 251 Act of Revocation in, 49
Floyd, William, 96 Bank of England in, 17, 18, 34, 52
Fortune, 192 Civil Wars in (1646“1649), 50
France. See also French Revolution commercial empire in, decline of,
civil revolution in, causes of, 35, 77 64“68
empire period in, 35“36 Conservative Party in, 65“66
Franklin in, 77“78 Corn Laws in, 18, 64
Jefferson in, 121, 123“124 Declaration of Indulgence in, 51
Louis XIV in, 35 Declaration of Rights in, 52
Revolutionary War aid from, 77“79, GDP growth rates (1999), 203
“Glorious Revolution” in, 2, 34, 49,
WWI costs for, 36 51
Franklin, Benjamin, 73, 96, 118 land/capital schematic for
at Constitutional Convention, (1720“1846), 65
Proclamation of 1763, 76
in France, 77“78 Quebec Act, 21, 58, 72, 74, 76“77, 78
Society for Political Enquiries, 122 Reform Act (1867) in, 19, 65
French Revolution, causes of, 35, 77 SNP in, 66
social choice theory in (1625“1776),
game theory, 264 49“58
belief cascades in, 265 South Sea Company in, 18
evolutionary, 99 Stamp Act, in colonies, 117
information cascades in, 265 Sugar Act, in colonies, 117
Nash equilibrium in, 264 Ulster Unionists in, 66
Gardoquin, Diego de, 104, 105, 118 unemployment rates (1999), 203
GDP (gross domestic product), 204 voter distribution, by party, 67
growth rates, U.S./Great Britain war costs for (1600“1800), 36
(1999), 203 Whig v. Tory Parties in, 53
in OECD nations, per capita, 39 WWI costs for, 36
George I (King), 54 The Great Depression, 224“225
George III (King), 57, 75, 115 Dow Jones average during, 224
gross domestic product. See GDP
military expenditures for (1933“1938), Grouchy, Sophie de, 125
Gutt, Camille, 235
WWI costs for, 36
Gibbon, Edward, History of the Decline Hamilton, Alexander, 30, 108, 136. See
and Fall of the Roman Empire, also Federalist Papers
Bank of the U.S. and, 55, 127“128
On a National Bank, 126
“Girondin Constitution,” 253
Report on the National Bank, 110
globalization, 276
Report on the Public Credit, 110, 126
“Glorious Revolution” (Great Britain),
A Report on the Subject of
2, 34, 49, 51
Manufactures, 110, 126
Godel-Turing theorem, 210“211, 245
decidability-halting problem and, “Hegemonic Internationalism,” 232, 238
Goldman, Eric, 185 collapse of, 217“222


Helvetius, Madame, 121 Declaration of Independence and, 115
“heresthetic” theory, 2, 67, 101 in France, 121, 123“124
Hitler, Adolf, 7, 32 Kentucky Resolutions and, 129
Hobbes, Thomas, 30, 249“250 Jeffords, James, 172
Leviathan, 50, 249, 250 Johnson, Lyndon B., 19, 164, 189
on property rights, 2
on state as “Leviathan,” 30“31 Kahn, Richard, 228
“Warre” for, 201, 202, 250 Kansas-Nebraska Act, Missouri
Hume, David, 30, 68 Compromise and, 148
Essay on Commerce, 110 Kennan, George, 236, 240
“Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 240
Kennedy, Paul, 23
110, 130
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
Humphrey, Hubert, 172, 188
Hunt, Cordell, 234 7, 23
Hussein, Saddam, Al-Qaeda and, 279, Kentucky Resolutions, 129
Keohane, Robert, 218
Keynes, John Maynard, 99, 225“226,
IBRD (International Bank for 226
Reconstruction and Bretton Woods System and, 21
Economic Consequences of the Peace
Development), 234, 241
The General Theory of Employment,
Ickes, Harold, 187
Interest and Money, 200, 225,
IMF (International Monetary Fund), 234
Articles of Agreement for, 234 226, 227, 228, 231, 232, 264
U.N. and, as part of, 237“239 International Clearing Union for,
in¬‚ation, 220 232
Treatise on Probability, 25, 226
“Phillips curve” and, 40
information cascades, in game theory, on unemployment, 230
“Keynesian Synthesis,” 200
“informational cascades,” 20 Khan, Genghis, 7
“instability theorem,” 175
International Bank for Reconstruction LaFollette, Bob, 172
and Development. See IBRD land distribution, within social choice
International Clearing Union, 232 theory, 45
International Monetary Fund. See IMF Laplace, Pierre-Simon, 278
Israel, Knesset, 27“28 LCM (long-term capital management),
Italy 205
political parties in, 27 LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) (Japan),
26, 214
Jackson, Andrew, 137 Lewis, Meriwether, 79
Liberal Democratic Party. See LDP
James II (King), 51
Japan “liberalism,” 171
Lincoln, Abraham, 30, 61. See also 1860
de¬‚ation in, 43
economic growth in, 26, 241 election (U.S.)
LDP in, 26, 214 “The Address at Cooper Institute,”
Jay, John, 104, 118. See also Federalist 155
Papers debates, with Douglas, 151“153,
Jefferson, Thomas, 55, 97, 104, 108, 154“155
136. See also “Madison-Jefferson inaugural address, 162
Equilibrium” on slavery, extension of, 135“136
agrarian coalition of, 19, 60“61 “Speech at New Haven, Connecticut,”
Condorcet™s in¬‚uence on, 120“125 155


Locke, John, Two Treatises of The New York Times, 141
Government, 252 Newton, Isaac
Opticks, 252
Long, Huey, 187
Principia, 252
Long Report, 221
long-term capital management. See LCM Nixon, Richard, 192
Lopez, Claude Anne, 121 civil rights activism and, 195
Louis XIV (King), 17, 35, 73 “Southern Strategy” of, 183, 191, 192
North America. See also U.S.
Louis XVI (King), 35, 75, 77, 78, 118,
agrarian empire in, 58“64
121, 124, 253
Lynch, Thomas, Jr., 97 land capital in (1756“1800), 117“119
North, Douglass, 2
Madison, James, 2, 30, 33, 59, 104. See Northwest Ordinance, 147, 148
also Federalist Papers slavery under, 136, 147, 152
as “architect of change,” 108 Nozick, Robert
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 250
Condorcet™s in¬‚uence on, 120“125
“Vices of the Political System of the Nye, Joseph, 218
United States,” 59, 104, 115, 120,
OECD (Organisation for Economic
Virginia Resolutions and, 129 Co-operation and Development),
“Madison-Jefferson Equilibrium,” 113, 10
GDP per capita within, 39
117, 121
Malthus, Thomas, Essay on the Ohio Valley (U.S.)
Principle of Population, 111, 253 “Pontiac™s War” and, 58
Marshall Aid program, 31 Quebec Act and, 72, 118
Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Seven Years War and, 117
Economics, 225 oligarchies, 5, 7, 113
Mazzei, Philip, Recherches Historiques Olive Branch Party, 27
sur les Etats-Unis, 122 Olson, Mancur, 2, 22, 23
Logic Of Collective Action, 23
McCain, John, 177
Power and Prosperity, 23
McCloy, John, 235
The Rise and Decline of Nations, 23
McGovern, George, 172, 177
McRae, Hamish, 205 Organisation for Economic
McKean, Thomas, 96 Co-operation and Development.
Merton, Robert, 205
Meyer, Eugene, 235 Ottoman Empire, 35
Missouri Compromise, 148, 149
Kansas-Nebraska Act and, 148 Paine, Thomas, 74, 82
Mobile Register, 140, 152 partisan alignment, 173
Moore, G.E., Principia Ethica, 226 under New Deal, 168, 173
Moral Majority, 193 race and, 174, 184
Morgenthau, Henry, 234 during U.S. elections, 129
Peel, Robert, 18, 64
Nader, Ralph, 172, 183 Philip II (King), 7, 17, 34
Nakamura number, 47 “Phillips curve,” 40
Napoleonic War, 60 Pierce, Franklin, 148
“Nash equilibrium,” 264 Polanyi, Michael, 202
political parties. See also activism,
National Union Party (U.S.), in 1860
election, 158 political party; political parties,
Nelson, Thomas, Jr., 97 third; political parties, U.S.
New Deal, 167, 187 activism of, 176“178
under Roosevelt, Franklin, 189 Conservative Party, 65“66


race, 195. See also Civil Rights Act
in Great Britain, 53
SNP, 66 (U.S.) (U.S.); slavery
Tory Party, 53 partisan alignment and, 174, 184
Ulster Unionist, 66 U.S. elections and, as factor, 168
Whig Party (Great Britain), 53 Read, George, 96
political parties, third, 182“183 Reform Act (Great Britain), 19, 65
“disaffected” voters and, 184, 196 Republican Party (U.S.), 185“187
Dixiecrats, 189 Bull Moose Progressive Party and, 186
political parties, U.S. See also economic policy positions, 171
Democratic Party (U.S.); political Federalist v., 17, 112“113, 125“128,
parties, third; Republican Party 138
(U.S.) ¬‚anking moves of, 179
balance between, 136“146 policy shifts of, 187, 188
Bull Moose Progressives, 186, 187 republics, democracies v., 1“2
“culture wars” among, 183 Revolutionary War (U.S.), 21
Democratic Party, 137“140, 179, 187, French aid for, 77“79, 83
rights. See property rights
188, 189, 190
Federalist v. Republican, 17, 112“113, Riker, William, 2, 100
on federalism, 101
125“128, 138
National Union Party, 158 “heresthetic” theory, 2, 67, 101
Liberalism against Populism, 2, 135
Republican Party, 17, 112“113,
on risk aversion, 102
125“128, 138, 171, 179,
risk aversion
185“187, 188
third parties, 182“183 within EU, 10“11
Whig v. Democratic, 137“140 Robinson, Harriet, 147
political party activism. See activism, Rockefeller, Nelson, 172
political party Roosevelt, Franklin, 174, 186“187,
“Pontiac™s War,” 76 234
Ohio Valley and, 58 New Deal under, 189
PPP (purchasing power parity), for Roosevelt, Theodore, 186
Russia. See also U.S.S.R.
OECD, 38
PR (proportional representation) WWI costs for, 36
in EU, 69
in Italy, 27 Sanford, Eliza, 147
Proclamation Act (Great Britain), 58 Scholes, Myron, 205
Scott, Dred, 149, 146. See also Dred
Proclamation of 1763 (Great Britain), 76
Scott v. Irene Emerson; Dred
property rights, Hobbes on, 2
Scott v. John F.A. Sanford
“prophets of chaos,” 16, 21, 202,
Scottish Nationalist Party. See SNP
proportional representation. See PR Scranton, William, 177
Public Choice Theory, 203 semi-collegium, 48, 51, 57
“punctuated social equilibrium,” 20, Seven Years War, 58, 71, 74, 80
Ohio Valley and, 117
purchasing power parity. See PPP Seward, William, 143, 155
Al-Qaeda, 279“280 under Kansas-Nebraska Act, 148
Hussein and, 279, 280 Lincoln and, extension of, 135“136
Quebec Act (Great Britain), 21, 58, 72, under Northwest Ordinance, 136,
74, 78, 85“90 147, 152
goals of, 76“77 political compromises over, 61
Ohio Valley™s role in, 72, 118 Taney Opinion™s effect on, 151


Smith, Adam, 30, 68, 106, 114, 126, Ulster Unionist Party, 66
U.N. (United Nations), IMF as part of,
229, 252
Smith, Al, 186 237“239
Smithsonian Agreement, 220 U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration. See UNRRA
Bretton Woods System and, 207
Smollet, Tobias, 56 unemployment
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, 225 Great Britain/U.S. rates (1999), 203
SNP (Scottish Nationalist Party), 66 Keynes on, 230
social chaos. See chaos theory, social Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See
social choice theory, 44“49 U.S.S.R.
aristocracies under, 109 UNRRA (U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation
autocracies under, 109 Administration), 235
U.S. (United States). See also Congress,
chaos in, 3“11
in Great Britain (1625“1776), 49“58 U.S.; constitutions, U.S.;
wars and, 61“62 Declaration of Independence
“social preference cycles,” 145 (U.S.); elections, U.S.; political
Soros, George, 205 parties, U.S.
South Sea Company, 55 Civil Rights Act, 168, 194
formation of, 18 Civil War, 21
“Southern Strategy,” of Nixon, 183, congressional factions in, 8
Constitution, 8
191, 192
Spain Declaration of Independence, 21, 58,
land claims of, in U.S., 104“105, 94“97, 115
economic growth in, 37“39
war costs for, 34“35 elections, 62, 139
War of Spanish Succession, 55, 35 electoral college in, 68“69
Stalin, Josef, 7 GDP growth rates (1999), 203
Stamp Act (U.S.), 117 land/capital schematic for
structurally stable dynamic systems, (1800“1860), 63
military expenditures in, 149, 37
Sugar Act (U.S.), 117 New Deal in, 167, 187
Revolutionary War, 21
Taney Opinion, slavery and, effect on, Spanish land claims in, 104“105,
151 118“119
Taylor, John, 127 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and, 138
Thatcher, Margaret, 66 unemployment rates (1999), 203
“Tory equilibrium,” 54 virtual representation in, colonial, 76
Tory Party Voting Rights Act, 168
in Great Britain, 53 WWI costs for, 37
“Tory equilibrium,” 54 U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist
Toussaint, Francois, 79 Republics)
Tracy, Destutt de, 124 economic growth in, 25“26, 37
Treatise of Political Economy, 124 military expenditures for, 37, 149
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (U.S.),
Van Buren, Martin, 8, 137
Treaty of Versailles, 223 Vedrine, Hubert, 43
Truman doctrine, 237 veto groups, 7, 10, 113
Trumbull, Lyman, 161 Vinson, Fred, 234
Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques, 124, Virginia Resolutions, 129
virtual representation, 76


Voltaire, Francois-Marie Arouet,
¸ “Pontiac™s War,” 58, 76
Newton™s Philosophy, 252 Revolutionary War (U.S.), 83
van Hayek, Friedrich, 202 Seven Years War, 58, 71, 74, 80, 117
voting cores, 98 social choice theory and, 61“62
Voting Rights Act (U.S.), 168 Spain, costs of (1600“1800), 34“35
of Spanish Succession, 35, 55
Wall Street crash, 224 WWI, costs of, 36“37
Wallace, George, 172, 191“192 “Warre,” 201, 202, 250
“Walpole Equilibrium,” 111, 117, 118, Washington, George, 58, 117, 127
Weld, William, 172
Walpole, Robert, 17, 55, 30 “Whig equilibrium,” 49, 64
war(s) Whig Party, in Great Britain, 53
as chaos, 6 Whig Party (U.S.), Democratic Party
Civil War, U.S., 61, 21 and, 137“140
Civil Wars, in Great Britain White, Henry Dexter, 234
(1646“1649), 50 William III (King), 17
Great Britain, costs of (1600“1800), Wilson, Pete, 172
WWI (World War I)
Napoleonic War, 60 costs of, 36“37

Other books in the series (continued from page iii)

Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World™s
Electoral System
Gary W. Cox and Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry™s Salamander: The
Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution
Jean Ensminger, Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an
African Society
David Epstein and Sharyn O™Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction
Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, The Transformation of Property Rights in the Gold
Coast: An Empirical Study Applying Rational Choice Theory
Clark C. Gibson, Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife
Policy in Africa
Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from
Medieval Trade
Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer, The Politics of Property
Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in
Mexico, 1876“1929
Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business
Organization, 1720“1844
Anna L. Harvey, Votes Without Leverage: Women in American Electoral
Politics, 1920“1970
Murray Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional
Choice in the Public Sector
John D. Huber, Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party
Politics in France
Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Con¬‚ict
Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Making and Breaking
Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Cabinet Ministers and
Parliamentary Government
Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, eds., Regulations, Institutions, and
Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications
Leif Lewin, Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics
(English Edition)
Gary Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights
John Londregan, Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can
Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?
C. Mantzavinos, Individuals, Institutions, and Markets
Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, eds., Congress:
Structure and Policy
Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and
Economic Performance
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action
Daniel N. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa
J. Mark Ramseyer, Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and
Economic Growth
J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy:
Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, The Fruits of Revolution: Property Rights,
Litigation, and French Agriculture, 1700“1860
Michael L. Ross, Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in
Southeast Asia
Shanker Satyanath, Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asia™s
Banking Crisis
Alastair Smith, Election Timing
David Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France
and Great Britain, 1688“1789
Charles Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the
Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1865“1921
George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism
Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent
Crisis, 1979“1999
John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and
State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey
David L. Weimer, ed., The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional
Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies


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