. 12
( 13)


Press, 1985). See also my “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Self-Transformation.”
A similar argument is made by Bernard Williams concerning moral princi-
ples; see “Styles of Ethical Theory” in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 71“92.
These kinds of distortions are merely more speci¬c instances of the kind of
disconnect that critics have noted about the requirement of second-order re-
¬‚ection on ¬rst-order aspects of the self for autonomy. See Marilyn Friedman,
“Autonomy and the Split-Level Self,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 24
no. 1 (1986): 19“35, and Irving Thalberg, “Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree
Action,” reprinted in The Inner Citadel, 123“136.
For an overview, see Morris Eagle, “Psychoanalytic Conceptions of the Self”
in Jane Strauss and George Goethals, eds., The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991), 49“65.
For discussion of recent social psychological work on the self that re¬‚ects
this tradition, see Roy Baumeister, “The Self,” in Handbook of Social Psychology,
Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, eds., vol. I (Boston,
John Christman

MA: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 680“740. For discussion of the historical develop-
ment of theories of the self, see Susan Harter, “Historical Roots of Contem-
porary Issues Involving Self-Concept,” in Bruce A. Bracken, ed., Handbook of
Self-Concept: Developmental, Social, and Clinical Considerations (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), 1“38, and Kenneth J. Gergen The Concept of Self
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 1“12.
See Baumeister, 690ff for overview and discussion of these observations.
See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings
of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980), 120ff. For a
discussion of the relation between such errors and moral philosophy, see
Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics
and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
1998“99 (1999), 315“31.
See Daryl J. Bem, “Self-Perception Theory” in L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 6 (New York: Academic Press, 1972). For
discussion, see Ross and Nisbett, Human Inference, 195“227.
This is shown in experiments in which subjects are given arti¬cial stimuli
inducing certain emotions but will mis-identify both the source and the na-
ture of that emotion (ignoring, for example, the readily apparent arti¬cial
source): See Ross and Nisbett, Human Inference, 199“210, for an overview.
See, for example, Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1997. For discussion, see Diana Meyers, Subjection and
This is not to say that liberalism, by de¬nition, is anti-perfectionist. There
are plenty of perfectionist liberal views around: see, for example, Joseph Raz,
The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Will Kymlicka, Lib-
eralism, Community, and Culture, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); and William
Galston Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
For further discussion of the contours of liberalism, see my Social and Po-
litical Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002),
chapter 4.
This is meant to express the principle of liberal legitimacy: see Rawls, Justice
as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001),
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 25“35, for discussion.
This formulation is meant to be neutral about the fundamental grounds for
this respect, leaving open the possibility that such ground is ultimately “po-
litical” rather than metaphysical. For discussion, see Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987); and John Gray, Post-Liberalism: Studies in
Political Thought. New York: Routledge, 1993).
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 10“12. Kymlicka sees this con-
straint on the view of value that is assumed in liberal theory, since he claims
that liberalism rests on this unique conception of value rather than the
assumption of the “priority of the right over the good” claimed here. For
discussion of this difference, see Christman, Social and Political Philosophy, 97.
Also, Gerald Gaus (Chapter 12 in the present volume) claims that liberalism
Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy 355

should be de¬ned as the tradition of political philosophy that puts ulti-
mate value on individual liberty (conceived as a presumptive right to non-
interference). I will only mention in passing here the reason that moves me
in another direction “ that “liberty” cannot function in this way as a basic
value since it is an essentially contested and, more importantly, derivative,
political value (derivative from the conception of the “right,” or justice, oper-
ative in the society). For discussion of the concept of liberty, see my The Myth
of Property, chapter 4, and Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2000), chapter 3.
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community,
and Culture; and Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue.
See, for example, Steven Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and George Sher, Beyond Neutrality:
Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
A paradigm case of this approach can be found in David Gauthier, Morals By
Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), but see also Jan Narve-
son The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988),
chapter 14.
This variant is seen most clearly in Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), but it survives in the view developed
in Political Liberalism “ that is, according to “political” liberalism “ where
principles of justice are established via an overlapping consensus among
reasonable comprehensive moral views “ citizens are able to “af¬rm” the
principles from “within their own comprehensive views” (Political Liberalism,
Lecture IV) “ that is morally. To do otherwise is to adopt the view that justice
is a mere modus vivendi. Also making much use of the kind of distinction
described in the text (or at least one parallel to it) is Habermas, especially
in the distinction he makes between “strategic” and “communicative” social
interaction. See Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1991), 58. For a similar distinction in approaches to political
justi¬cation, see Gerald Gaus, “Liberalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu), p. 5. See also Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice, 1“7.
This is an explication of a Kantian conception of the grounds of justice,
utilizing the views of several writers in this tradition, most notably Rawls
and Habermas (about whom more will be said later). But the call for in-
cluding a sense of empathic respect is motivated by the arguments of Susan
Moller Okin in Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989),
This is compatible, it should be repeated, with perfectionist brands of liberal
thought, as long as such perfectionism retains this “endorsement constraint”
and admits of a pluralism of (allegedly objective) values.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35ff.
This point is stressed in Kant (in¬‚uenced, no doubt, by Rousseau): see “On
the Common Saying that It May Be True in Theory but Not in Practice,” in
Practical Philosophy, Mary Gregor, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
John Christman

Press, 1996), 273“310. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 47“52 (see especially p. 52,
n. 43). This point, and its importance, is overlooked in much recent liberal
theory: see, for example, Gerald Gaus, “Liberalism.”
The Theory of Communicative Action, vols. I and II, Thomas McCarthy trans.
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984, 1987). See also Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action, 43“194.
Habermas, “Moral Development and Ego Identity,” in Communication and
the Evolution of Society, Thomas McCarthy, trans. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press,
1979), 69“94.
See “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,” 120“22, and Between
Facts and Norms, 107. In the truncated version here, I combine what Habermas
calls a rule of “argumentation” (principle “D”) with the principle of univer-
salization he labels “U.” Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William
Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 107.
This view of normativity and personal individuation is controversial, and cer-
tainly much more complex than this. For critical discussion, see for example,
Seyla Benhabib, “The General and Concrete Other,” in Eva Feder Kittay and
Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowah, NJ: Rowman and
Little¬eld, 1987) 154“77; and Allison Weir, “Toward A Model of Self-Identity:
Habermas and Kristeva,” in Feminists Read Habermas (New York: Routledge,
1995), 263“82.
To say that political principles will be “¬‚eshed out” is to align oneself with
Rawlsian political liberalism, understood a certain way, where the justi¬ca-
tion of principles is hypothetical (even via the use of public reason): these
principles are justi¬ed if an overlapping consensus involving them could be
established. For other theorists, actual social deliberation and democratic
communication constitutes the justi¬cation of principles. See, for example,
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms.
For arguments along these lines, see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics
of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Nancy Fraser,
Justice Interruptus (New York: Routledge, 1997); and Jurgen Habermas, The
Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Even Rawls even-
tually claimed that the dynamics of public reason “ real world, ongoing,
interaction among persons and groups provides the ultimate anchor for the
overlapping consensus on which justice is grounded: see “The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 129“180.
See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation.
For discussion of epistemic authority over one™s own desires and motives,
see Gerald Gaus, Justi¬catory Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), Part I.
It is in this way that autonomy can be seen to involve a level of self-trust, as
has been pointed out by several writers. See, for example, Paul Benson,
“Free Agency and Self-Worth,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994), 650“68;
Trudy Govier, “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem,” Hypatia 8 (Winter,
1993), 99“120; Carolyn McLeod and Susan Sherwin, “Relational Autonomy,
Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy 357

Self-Trust, and Health Care for Patients Who are Oppressed,” in Mackenzie
and Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy, 259“79; and Anderson and Honneth™s
Chapter (6) in this volume.
For a defense of the Hobbesean approach, as I am using that label, see
Gauthier, Morals By Agreement. For an argument that purely instrumental
rationality (on which the Hobbesean model is predicated) cannot adequately
account for social stability and political authority, see Jon Elster, The Cement
of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter 3, and
Solomonic Judgments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapters
1 and 4. For criticism of a different type, which strikes at the heart of the
Hobbesean framework, see Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, The Pathologies
of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). For
general discussion of this issue, see Habermas, The Theory of Communicative
Action, Vol. II, 119“52.
For a speci¬c argument of this sort, see Thomas Christiano, “The Incoher-
ence of Hobbesian Justi¬cations of the State,” American Philosophical Quar-
terly 31 (1994), 23“38. For a general discussion, see my Social and Political
Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, chapter 2.
Though arrived at from a different direction, the claims being defended here
involving the relation between autonomy and a persons being designated as
speaking for herself resemble closely Paul Benson™s views: see his Chapter 5
in the prevent volume.
And I rely greatly on the detailed and powerful analysis of “public justi-
¬cation” and its role in political legitimacy developed by Gerald Gaus in
Justi¬catory Liberalism.
Assuming some quali¬ed internalism for the purposes of political philosophy
is not the same as claiming this as the best epistemic account, period. How-
ever, for an argument against strict externalism as an epistemic standard,
see John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (London: Hutchinson,
1987), 133“49. Also, what is meant by “hermeneutic” here is that a coherent
interpretation could be applied to the belief (or value set) that includes the
contested element.

This bibliography contains works cited in the chapters of this book and so should
serves as a useful reference guide for those interested in work on autonomy and
liberalism (and related topics).

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with Warren Lux (2004). “Knowing Your Own Strength: Accurate Self-
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Ackerman, Bruce, 328 autobiography, 58, 62, 65, 70, 72
adaptive preferences, 159“61 autonomy
Addelson, Kathryn, 53 agonistic, 16
advertising, 212“4 capacities, 127, 132
agency competency (conditions), 3, 12, 49,
agential authority, 112 55, 168
agential unity, 60, 71 conception vs. concept of, 230
agential ownership, 101“10, 113 conceptual conditions of, 332“6
and authority, 106“17 democratic, 195
discursive dimension of, 109 and denigration, 131
identi¬cation theories of, 103, 104, dialogical model of, 13
107 (see also identi¬cation) ethical, 15, 232“4
agentic power, 35 global, 120, 198
agentic skills 9, 10, 28, 36“40, 47, historical account of, 41“2, 103“4,
48, 130 (see also competency) 333
agonistic politics, 255, 257 identity-based accounts of, 112
agreement, 4, 7, 246“66 individualistic conception of, 128,
alienation, 54, 83“90, 93, 94, 112, 130
legal, 15, 224, 234“6
Allen, Anita A., 95“6 liberal conceptions of, 10“11,
Anderson, Joel, 172, 240 272“300, 251“4
Anderson, Joel, and Axel Honneth, local, 2, 94, 120
moral, 2, 15, 17, 18, 163, 167, 196,
7“8, 12“13, 270
Appiah, K. Anthony, 4, 89, 91, 97, 123 230“1, 256, 276“88, 296“9,
Aristotle, 179 307“26
Arendt, Hannah, 255 personal, 2, 17, 18, 163, 164, 166,
Arpaly, Nomi, 103, 106 167, 196, 198, 228, 229, 293“9,
attribution effect, 66 307“26
authenticity, 3, 5“6, 9, 11, 12, 27, 32“6, personal style theories of, 43“5
political, 15, 236“7, 251“7
77, 84, 86“90, 93“4, 105


Calhoun, Cheshire, 105
autonomy (cont.)
Chodorow, Nancy, 53, 54
and polyvocality, 134
Christiano, Thomas, 357
recognitional, 129“32, 137, 142“4
Christman, John, 6, 18“19, 41“2,
relational, 8, 14, 130, 145
retrospective, 41“2 54, 104, 106, 123, 155“6, 259,
and self-conception, 90“4 301
civic endurance, 16, 262“3
and self-respect, 132, 133
civic responsiveness, 16, 262“5
and semantic resources, 136
civic virtue, 178“81, 260“6
and semantic-symbolic
and corruption, 178“9
environment, 137
Code, Lorraine, 23
social, 12, 15, 130, 237“8
coercion, 9, 17
social conditions for, 129“30,
commodity fetishism, 211
communitarianism, 4, 5, 8
social dimensions of, 118, 151
community, 237
value of, 17, 167“9
competencies, 260, 336
compulsion, 35
Babbitt, Susan, 53
Connolly, William, 22
Baumeister, Roy, 353
conscience, 18, 323“5
Beckett, Christopher, 148
consciousness, 60
Bell, Daniel, 210
false, 211“14
Bellah, Robert, 353
self-transparent, 7, 133“5
Benhabib, Seyla, 22, 55, 94, 146, 239,
consent, 250
Constant, Benjamin, 181“2
Benn, Stanley, 274, 275, 293, 294
constraint, 229, 242
Benson, Paul, 5, 6, 8, 11“14, 51
consumer sovereignty, 15“16, 204“24
Bentham, Jeremy, 313“14
consumerism, 205, 218, 220
Berkowitz, L., 75
contractualism, 4, 292
Bentley, Russell, 263, 270
critical re¬‚ection, 317, 333“40,
Berlin, Isaiah, 23, 35, 183, 185, 188,
227“9, 311
Crittenden, Jack, 22
Berofsky, Bernard, 20, 352
cultural homogenization, 215“17
body, as locus of control, 52 (see also
Dagger, Richard, 8, 14, 122, 149
Bordo, Susan, 51
de Beauvoir, Simone, 160“3
Bosanquet, Bernard, 292
de Tocqueville, Alexis, 182
Boxill, Bernard, 125
deliberation, 16, 29, 344
Bratman, Michael, 73, 103, 121, 125
democracy, 7, 257, 348
Brighouse, Harry, 301
Dennett, Daniel, 10“11, 56“73
Brink, Bert van den, 7, 16“17, 147
desire, 20“1, 148
Brison, Susan J., 51, 53, 148
-formation, 42
Brodt, S. E., 75
Dewey, John, 186
Brothers, Dorothy, 148
Dillon, Robin, 123
Brown, Wendy, 22
domination, 13, 51, 153, 157
Burtt, Shelley, 201
Double, Richard, 5, 43“5, 352
Buss, David M., 169
Dutton, Donald G., 154
Buss, Sarah, 121, 146
Index 379

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 207“8,
Dworkin, Gerald, 3, 20, 81, 119“20,
172, 301, 305, 316, 353
Gaus, Gerald, 2, 16“17, 196, 240, 354
Dworkin, Ronald, 240, 313“14, 316,
Gauthier, David, 277, 279
318, 353
Geertz, Clifford, 294
Geuss, Raymond, 23, 239
Ellison, Ralph, 111“13, 116, 119“20
Gey, Steven G., 200
Elster, John, 159
Gilligan, Carol, 22
embodiment, 156
good, conception of, 18, 320“5
enculturation, 51
Govier, Trudy, 54, 148
endorsement, 5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 18, 84,
Gray, John, 22
87, 103
Green T.H., 183
endorsement constraint, 340, 350
Guyer, Paul, 310, 312
epistemic authority, 344, 347
evaluations, strong, 232
Habermas, Jurgen, 21, 23, 145, 146,
externalism, 277, 278
externalities, 219 241, 343, 355“6
happiness, 78
Kantian account of, 311
Feinberg, Joel, 120, 132, 147, 274
pursuit of, 309“14
feminism, 4, 8, 12, 31, 37, 40, 128
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray, 74
Fischer, John Martin, 125
Hardy, Thomas, 337
Flanagan, Owen, 74, 75
Harman, Gilbert, 354
Forst, Rainer, 2, 8, 14“15, 202“24,
Harrington, James, 179
275, 296
Harter, Susan, 354
Foot, Philippa, 281
Harvey, David, 22
Foucault, Michel, 22, 39“40, 136, 255
Harvey, J., 154
Frank, Robert, 221, 222
Haslanger, Sally, 123
Frankena, William, 302
Hawkins, Jennifer, 87
Frankfurt, Harry, 3, 10“11, 20“22, 51,
Haworth, Lawrence, 20, 120
73, 80“2, 87“9, 95, 101, 103, 106,
Hayes, Sharon, 305
113, 146, 316, 320
Heath, Joseph, 8, 15“16
Fraser, Nancy, 136, 147, 149
Hegel, G. W. F., 131, 138, 140, 146
free-rider problem, 218
Herman, Judith, 153“4, 171
freedom, 13“15, 17, 128, 138, 181, 291,
heteronomy, 36, 155 (see also
as non-domination, 23, 183, 184, nonautonomy)
and male dominance, 155“9
Hobbes, Thomas, 19, 159, 206, 218,
as non-interference, 183
Kant™s principle of, 310, 319 279
Hohfeld, Wesley, 286, 288
of religion, 241
Honneth, Axel, 7, 8, 12“13
of the will, 20
Horney, Karen, 352
republican, 192
Humboldt, Willhelm von, 312
(see also liberty)
Humphrey, Nicholas, 61“2
Friedman, Marilyn, 12“14, 245, 268
Hurka, Thomas, 21
fundamental attribution error, 338
Hutt, William Harold, 207“8
fundamental liberal principles, 272,
hypothetical agreement, 344
274, 277, 279, 280, 284, 287

identi¬cation, 3, 20, 96, 316, 335
agreement-based, 251, 254, 256,
identity, 11, 15, 28, 30, 35, 77
traits, 78, 79 259
Hobbesean, 341“6
politics, 4, 8, 138
and individualism, 118, 120
practical, 102“6
Kantian, 341“5, 347
racial, 11, 88“92
without agreement, 16, 245“71
scripted, 91
liberty, 14, 16, 20, 129, 178“9, 240,
impartiality, 139, 140
individualism, 2, 8“9, 128“30 274, 301
intersubjective conception of, 14,
hyper-, 4, 8
rights-based, 132 226
of the ancients and the moderns,
individuality, 54
instrumental reason, 276, 279 181“3
of the moderns, 14
integration, 9, 10
negative and positive conception of,
internalism, 278, 281“2
intersubjectivism, 140 182, 188, 227“9, 238, 254
political, 229, 236
Lindley, Richard, 20
James, Susan, 55
Locke, John, 186, 275
John Paul II, 209
locus of control, 71
Johnston, David, 321
Lugones, Maria, 105“6, 122
justice, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 97, 128,
129, 133, 137, 138, 242, 247, 252,
MacCallum, Gerald, 229
Macedo, Stephen, 306
as fairness, 141
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 150, 183
justi¬cation of principle of, 16
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 22, 149
proceduralist, 127, 139“44
Mackenzie, Catriona, 20, 22, 145
republican, 14
Macleod, Christine, 171
majoritarianism, 199
justi¬catory regress, 2, 5“6
Mamet, David, 154
public, 236
Margalit, Avishai, 147
market failure, 217“20
Kant, Immanuel, 2, 17“18, 20, 27, 128,
market neutrality, 215
145, 160“3, 261, 282“3, 287, 289,
Marx, Karl, 211
291“2, 308“14
McDowell, John, 133“6, 148
Kaufman, Alexander, 326
Mead, George Herbert, 131, 146
Kittay, Eva F., 23, 146, 172
Mele, Alfred, 20, 148, 352
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 295“7
Meyers, Diana Tietjens, 6“10, 94, 121,
Korsgaard, Christine, 73, 122, 283,
148, 171
Mill, John Stuart, 200, 206, 312
Kristinsson, Sigur°ur, 21, 165
Miller, David, 202
Kymlicka, Will, 21, 22, 149, 240, 354
Mills, Charles, 21
Moon, Donald, 22, 267
Larmore, Charles, 303
moral power, 141, 143
legitimacy, 247“66, 330“51
Moran, Richard, 148
legitimation, 5“7, 16“19, 21“2
multiple personality disorder,
hierarchical conceptions of, 5“6
political, 5, 6 61“3
Index 381

priority of the right, 16
Nagel, Thomas, 83, 95“6
property rights, 285
narrative, 10, 64
psychoanalysis, 31, 134, 135, 338
coherence, 69, 70
public reason, 257“60, 287“91, 298,
module, 67“9
narrativity, 21“2 348
Narveson, Jan, 284
rape, 170
Nedelsky, Jennifer, 54, 145
rationality, 53, 141, 290
Nelson, Hilde, 55
Ravizza, Mark, 125
Nisbett, Richard, 354
Rawls, John, 2, 8, 14“16, 18“19, 22, 51,
Noddings, Nell, 22
Noggle, Robert, 121 132“6, 138“45, 147, 186, 245,
nonautonomy, 27 (see also 247“9, 251“3, 257, 269, 289,
317“20, 324, 325, 342, 343, 347


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