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was prepared to argue not only that force employed against Catholics was a
justi¬able political policy . . . but also, and inconsistently with the presupposi-
tions of his own general argument, he maintained that the application of force
even carried with it the prospects that Catholics would abandon their religious
beliefs and join the ranks of Protestantism. That a thinker such as Locke would
tolerate such a glaring inconsistency can only be explained in terms of an atti-
tude so deeply held that no reasoned argument against it . . . could overrule its
explanatory status as an axiom of political life in seventeenth century England.
Maybe the view that force can yield results when applied to Catholics
becomes slightly more plausible if one accepts the Lockean claim that
Catholic ceremonies and teachings are literally absurd. I guess the more
absurd they are, the more indirect ef¬cacy force might have in jolting
somebody out of the corresponding beliefs. And maybe Locke thought
something like that about atheism. Maybe he was thinking that the exis-
tence of God is so obvious that it™s just a matter of forcing people to look

· Cohen, If You™re an Egalitarian, How Come You™re So Rich?, pp. ±“°.
 Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics, pp. ±°°“±.
 God, Locke, and Equality
and see and consider. After all, we were all atheists once, says Locke: this
is a fault “which we were every one of us once guilty of.” In the Third
Letter for Toleration, Locke even suggested that the main obstacle to religion
was ethical: if magistrates would only “interpose their power . . . against
drunkenness, lasciviousness, and all sorts of debauchery . . . and by their
administration, countenance, and example, reduce the irregularities of
men™s manners . . . and bring sobriety, peaceableness, industry, and hon-
esty into fashion,”° then men would not turn against “the light of their
reason, [and] do violence to their understandings and forsake truth, and
salvation, too.”± Certainly we know that Locke believed the argument
for God™s existence was elementary “ not of course innate “ but some-
thing which required no particularly abstruse reasoning and might be
arrived at by the intellect of the plainest person.
Elsewhere, Locke takes a rather less sanguine view of the problem.
He observed in the Essay that there have been many serious thinkers
who denied the existence of God. (In The Reasonableness of Christianity
he mentioned the rather casual polytheism of the Greek philosophers
(RC: ±), a polytheism that came close to indifference as to whether
or not there really was a God in a morally signi¬cant sense.) “Besides
the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded
upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discovered, in these
later Ages, whole Nations, at the Bay of Soldania, in Brazil, . . . and in the
Caribbee islands, etc., amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of
a God, no religion” (E: ±..). And he hazarded the suggestion “ quite
dangerous, one would have thought, to his own enterprise “ that there
may be more atheists around even in England than is generally believed.
Close attention, says Locke, to “the lives and discourses of people not so
far off ” might reveal
that many, in more civilized Countries, have no very strong, and clear
Impressions of a Deity upon their Minds; and that the Complaints of Atheism,
made from the Pulpit are not without Reason. And though only some pro¬‚i-
gate Wretches own it . . . barefacedly now; yet perhaps, we should hear, more
than we do, of it, from others, did not the fear of the Magistrate™s Sword . . . tie
up People™s Tongues; which, were the Apprehension[ ] of Punishment . . . taken
away, would as openly proclaim their Atheism, as their lives do. (E: ±..)
However, this passage is interesting also in its suggestion that what law
can do is suppress atheism “ that is, prevent it from being proclaimed
and ensure that it doesn™t acquire the sort of wild¬re popularity that
 ° ±
Locke, Third Letter for Toleration, p. . Ibid., p. . Ibid., p. ·°.
µ
Tolerating Atheists?
might follow if its public avowal did not have to be furtive. That may
help a little with the problems we have been wrestling with for the last
few paragraphs. Toleration, in Locke™s system, is a multifaceted ideal. It
includes not only refraining from attempts at the forcible imposition of
beliefs, but also not prohibiting speech or gatherings or organizations,
and not disqualifying those of minority religions from public life. Now
even if it does not make sense for Locke to withdraw the bene¬t of the
¬rst of these elements of toleration from the atheist “ since there is little
prospect of forcible conversion “ still the other aspects of toleration can
sensibly be withdrawn, and atheist organizations crushed and atheists
excluded from common and public life.

©
It goes without saying that, as a bottom-line political position, this view “
that atheists should be excluded from public life “ is not an option for us.
But the bottom-line is not everything. And the fact that we don™t buy the
bottom-line does not mean we should not be exercised by Locke™s reason
for arriving at that bottom-line “ namely, his conviction that a society
inhabited by a signi¬cant number of people who deny the existence of
God is running a grave risk with its public morality. We must not reason
from rejection of Locke™s solution to the non-existence of the problem
he identi¬ed. Apart from anything else, there actually is continuing con-
troversy in modern liberal philosophy about the foundations of equality
and human rights and about the extent to which these can be sustained
without religious belief. Some approach even the legal idea of equality
in explicitly religious terms, and the most recent book-length treatment
of equality as a political ideal is skeptical about any purely secular foun-
dation. We take equality seriously, and “ at least for us theorists “ it
is an open question what that requires of us in the way of moral and
philosophical foundations. Somewhere hard work has to be done on the
question of whether basic equality can be made sense of, philosophically,
in purely secular terms. John Locke™s reasons for thinking that atheists
should be excluded from public life may not be reasons of public pol-
icy for us; but they are still relevant to our philosophical enterprise of
trying to arrive at a comprehensive grounding for and justi¬cation of our
commitment to this ideal.
 See Waldron, “What Plato Would Allow.”
 See e.g., Fletcher, “In God™s Image,” p. ±°, and also Coons and Brennan, By Nature Equal,
pp. ±µ“±,
 God, Locke, and Equality
Beyond that, we have the debate surrounding John Rawls™s “political”
liberalism, and his views about public reason and the ability of public rea-
son to accommodate arguments that proceed from religious premises.
Suppose “ as I am inclined to believe “ that a commitment to human
equality is most coherent and attractive when it is grounded in theolog-
ical truth, truths associated particularly with the Christian heritage. On
Rawls™s account, that is a comprehensive philosophical conception. It
offers perhaps a path to an important principle that a political theory
of justice must take seriously; Rawls, for example, recognizes that basic
equality is crucial to justice.µ But it is an undoubtedly sectarian path, for
it appeals to considerations that many people in society claim they can
make no sense of, or to considerations that make them acutely uncom-
fortable and require them to modify or rethink the basis of their own
comprehensive convictions. Rawls is not saying that religious concep-
tions of equality or religious paths to equality are crazy or unreasonable.
But there is no question of their representing a consensus for a well-
ordered society under modern conditions. There is, he says, in modern
society a diversity of comprehensive doctrines, some religious and some
not, and since this diversity “is not a mere historical condition that may
soon pass away,” everyone has to recognize that the ascendancy of any
one such comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by “the op-
pressive use of state power.” Now, he says, it is a crucial presupposition
of modern liberalism that state power is to be used to sustain only the
political structure of liberalism, and citizens must be left to work out
for themselves how this relates to their personal comprehensive convic-
tions.· Rawls leaves us then with two conclusions, so far as the religious
basis of equality is concerned. First, the religious basis of equality may
not be adopted or established as the of¬cial ideology of equality; and sec-
ond, even individual citizens are not to appeal to their own convictions
about the religious basis of equality in deciding how to exercise their
own political power, in deciding how to vote on the basics of justice, for
example, or in in¬‚uencing the votes of others. The two conclusions
are connected by the Rawlsian idea of public reason. The basic social and
 µ See ibid., pp. ± and ·“±.  Ibid., pp. “·.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. ± ff.
· Ibid., p. ±: “When there is a plurality of reasonable doctrines, it is unreasonable or worse to
want to use the sanctions of state power to correct, or to punish, those who disagree with us.”
 Ibid., pp. µ“. “In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not
to appeal to comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines “ to what we as individuals or
members of associations see as the whole truth . . . [C]itizens are to conduct their fundamental
discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based
on values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse.”
·
Tolerating Atheists?
political structure of a well-ordered society is sustained and elaborated
through the deliberation and decisions of of¬cials and citizens exercising
various political powers. The medium of deliberation and decision is
public reason, and since that is the medium through which state power
is exercised, it must be kept free of any taint of sectarian philosophical
conviction. There must be a commitment on the part of all who partici-
pate in public reason to offer up and to act upon only those reasons that
it is reasonable to expect that others involved and others affected can
accept.
Much of the modern debate about Rawlsian public reason surrounds
the second of his conclusions “ that citizens may not appeal to their
religious convictions in voting or in arguing for particular political posi-
tions.µ° And clearly the issues we have been studying are relevant to that.
If the Lockean view that I have been outlining is correct, it may be im-
possible to articulate certain important egalitarian commitments without
appealing to what one takes to be their religious grounds. If so, the Rawl-
sian exclusion seems unreasonable.µ± Rawls™s view may seem appealing
so long as we are assured that any reasonable political position can be
defended within the con¬nes of public reason, as he understands it; but if
there are certain otherwise reasonable positions that cannot be defended
in that way, than Rawls™s view begins to look arbitrary, especially if the
upshot is to remove the positions in question from the political agenda,
rather than modify the constraints of public reason to accommodate
them.µ
But of course the Lockean position goes far beyond this debate. Locke
is not just saying that religious argumentation about equality should be
permitted in public life; he is arguing that it is indispensable. I emphasize
“religious argumentation about equality.” Locke in general is not inhos-
pitable to something like Rawlsian constraints of public reason. He does
not believe that religious considerations should be introduced willy-nilly
 Ibid., pp. ±µ ff.
µ° In support of something like the Rawlsian position, see Audi, “Separation of Church and State”;
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice; and Nagel, “Moral Con¬‚ict and Political
Legitimacy.” For the other side, see Raz, “Facing Diversity”; Connolly, Why I am not a Secularist;
Perry, “Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality”; and McConnell, “Five Reasons to Reject
the Claim that Religious Arguments Should be Excluded.”
µ± In Waldron, “Religious Contributions to Political Deliberation,” I argued that it may be impossi-
ble to articulate and defend certain positions on welfare and redistribution without appealing to
religious grounds, and others have argued that this may be impossible too for certain positions on
abortion and other issues concerning the boundaries of human life: see Finnis, “Public Reason,
Abortion, and Cloning.”
µ For Rawls™s vacillation on this with regard to the speci¬c example of abortion, see Rawls, Political
Liberalism, p. n, and the “correction” in a new preface at p. lv.
 God, Locke, and Equality
into public life. The upshot of his position on toleration is that most re-
ligious doctrines “ particularly on issues about worship and creed “ are
politically irrelevant, and those who exercise (or call for the exercise of )
political power should have nothing to do with them (LCT:  and ).
But equality is different. The reasons why men are not permitted to
dominate and exploit one another are fundamental to politics and they
must be properly understood. They are matters we must get to the bottom of,
whether or not the bottom turns out to be controversial and philosoph-
ically sectarian. If we don™t get to the bottom of these issues, if we shy
away from the foundations of equality because we are afraid of offend-
ing somebody or of requiring others to go somewhere in their thoughts
and deliberations where they would rather not go, then we risk making
our egalitarian political order more shallow and less articulate than it
ought to be.µ There may have been a time, Locke says, when we could
afford to leave all this implicit (nd T: ±±± “±). But basic equality is now
under attack by sophisticated bodies of theory, which have as their aim
the establishment of political power on an inegalitarian basis. So now
the implicit must become explicit, and what was vague must now be
carefully unpacked and expounded, even at the expense of the genial
consensus that vagueness guarantees. “To understand Political Power
right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all
Men are naturally in” (nd T: ).
Rawls™s arguments imply that if we move in this direction “ if we
think it necessary publicly to explore the comprehensive foundations
of our egalitarianism “ then we must accept the risk of sectarianism
and of being seen to exercise (and of actually exercising) state power
on a basis “about which citizens as reasonable persons are bound to
differ uncompromisingly.”µ It would be nice to be able to answer this
by saying, “Well if the Lockean argument about equality is right, then
those who hold non-religiously grounded conceptions of equality are
revealed to be unreasonable, for now they do not accept what is necessary
for a well-ordered egalitarian society.” But I don™t think that™s the only
response. Apart from anything else, it fails to distinguish between what
µ And it™s not just a matter of public philosophy. We may risk actually doing the wrong thing, so
far as equality is concerned. Justice McLean in his dissent in Dred Scot v. Sanford thought the
US Supreme Court did the wrong thing because they could not be convinced that the plaintiff
slave was not just a chattel, but a person entitled to justice because “[h]e bears the impress of
his Maker . . . and he is destined to an endless existence.” See Dred Scott v. Sandford ° US ,
µµ° (±µ), McLean J. dissenting. I am grateful to Hadley Arkes for drawing this passage to my
attention: see Arkes, “Lochner v. New York and the Cast of our Laws,” p. ±µ.
µ Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. ±.

Tolerating Atheists?
is a reasonable view in the sense of what view turns out to be necessary
for a well-ordered egalitarian society, and what is a reasonable view
in the sense of what turns out to be a reasonable exercise of human
intellect under what Rawls refers to as the burdens of judgment.µµ It is
patently true that secular or atheistic thought (including secular or atheist
thought about the basis of social and political relations) is reasonable in
the second sense. (Rawls uses both conceptions of reasonableness in
Political Liberalism; and he either equivocates between them or assumes,
quite without argument, that anything which is unreasonable in the ¬rst
sense is also unreasonable in the second.)
A more sensible approach is to bear in mind that it is impossible to
avoid commitment in political theory. If we try too hard to be non-
sectarian, we will end up saying nothing. As things stand, not every
ingredient even in a Rawls political liberalism is entirely comfortable for
every member of the community. One of the basic foundations of Rawls™s
liberalism is a particular conception of the human person as a free agent,
with certain moral powers. These powers are to be taken seriously and
not simply regarded as reducible, psychologically, to various drives and
rationalizations.µ Rawls™s view “ in which I think he is quite correct “
is that it is not possible to reason well or reliably about matters of justice
without a conception of this kind “ that is, without a serious moralistic
conception of moral personality, the capacity for a conception of the
good, and the capacity for a sense of justice.µ· Anyone who is skeptical
about that will not see the point of a large part of Rawls™s theory. Yet
there are many people “ mostly sophisticated people in our society “ who
are quite skeptical about all that, who indeed regard the notion of its
signi¬cance and irreducibility as a myth, perhaps as much of a myth
as the existence of God. So if you want to get a ¬‚avor of what Locke
is saying about religious skepticism and the consequence of religion™s
exclusion from public reason, you can get a sense of it from the way
in which John Rawls would be uncomfortable developing a theory of
justice in the company of various Nietzscheans or radical Freudians who
believed that all this moralistic talk of agency and moral personality was
redundant and reducible nonsense.
The analogy “ between John Locke on God and John Rawls on moral
personality “ is all the more striking, of course, when you realize that
moral personality has to be able to do by itself in Rawls™s theory all the
work for equality that is done, for Locke, by the notion of our status in

µµ µ µ·
For the burdens of judgment, see ibid., pp. µ ff. Ibid., pp. · ff. Ibid., pp. ± ff.
° God, Locke, and Equality
the eyes of God. For Locke, the religious foundation is indispensable: we
have seen it do important work in political theory, as a premise and as
a constraint. For Rawls, the moral personality stuff is a similarly load-
bearing part of the theoretical structure, and similarly indispensable. Let
me be clear about this analogy. I am not saying that Rawls™s political
liberalism fails and that eventually he has to reach down into the bowels
of some more comprehensive conception in order to establish his notion
of moral personality. All I am saying is that the overlapping consensus
that de¬nes his political liberalism does have indispensable content, and some
of that content is controversial. In Rawls™s case, the essential ingredient of
a recognition of moral personality is one of the controversial premises.
I think Rawls would say that anyone who proposes to participate in
discourse about justice while remaining skeptical about that is not, in
fact, being reasonable (in this ¬rst of the two senses of reasonableness
that I identi¬ed a moment ago).µ And that is exactly what Locke is
saying, only about something slightly different. It is not reasonable, he
suggests, to think that you can proceed safely in public discourse or in
public life, without accepting the theism which in Locke™s view is an
indispensable basis for equality and social stability. “The taking away of
God, though but even in thought, dissolves all.”

©©©
Of course, our ability to grasp the Lockean position in this way, by
analogy with Rawls on moral personality, doesn™t show that Locke is
right and that we do need the idea of God and of our relation to God
in order to establish the principle of basic human equality. Many deny
this “ I am sure many of my readers deny this “ and I want to end my
argument with some more general re¬‚ections on the position that I have
attributed to Locke.
The position I have foisted on him is that atheism is a menace, in
large part because it is impossible to arrive at, articulate, or defend a
deep and robust conception of basic human equality without some sort
of transcendent premise. What are we to make of this as a general thesis
in liberal theory, as opposed to one that is safely con¬ned to the histor-
ical context in which John Locke thought about political philosophy? It
certainly seems counter-intuitive to us, and (as I said at the beginning
µ See above, p. .
±
Tolerating Atheists?
of section VI) the particular consequence Locke drew from it “ that
atheism is not to be tolerated, that atheists are to be disenfranchised “ is
quite out of the question as a practical conclusion for modern liberal
theory. But how should we read this counter-intuitiveness? Is it sim-
ply con¬rmation of the verdict that John Dunn entered in ± “ that
one “cannot conceive of constructing an analysis of any issue in con-
temporary [i.e. present-day] political theory around the af¬rmation or
negation of anything which Locke says about political matters”?µ If so,
this would con¬rm the central claim of the Cambridge school, that there
is something inherently inappropriate about raiding Locke™s work (or
any other body of work so distant from us) for premises, conclusions,
arguments, and insights to be recycled in twenty-¬rst century political
philosophy.
I am doubtful about this conclusion. I said in Chapter ± that we should
not be too quick to congratulate ourselves on having left the religious
issues behind us, so far as the defense and elaboration of basic equality is
concerned. And the point is relevant to the historicist concern. The issue,
which in various ways is still familiar to us, of how much work can be done
in moral and political theory without some speci¬c religious premises
was also perfectly familiar to John Locke and his contemporaries in
seventeenth-century England. It is not a case of his assuming, as a matter
of background world-view, that of course religion must be an ingredient,
and our assuming, as a matter of a different background world-view,
that of course it is not. Whatever our discomfort with Locke™s particular
conclusion about atheism, it turns out he is haunted by meta-ethical
anxieties that are not dissimilar to our own (even if he is inclined to come
down on a different side from that of the secularists among us). So it
cannot sensibly be regarded as an offense against historical propriety
to bring his re¬‚ections about religion and the basis of political morality
into relation with our re¬‚ections about religion and the basis of political
morality.
The Lockean discussion is clearest in The Reasonableness of Christianity.
Locke is well aware that many people claim that we can reason through
to important moral truths without religious authority. He believes that
the currency of this claim reveals something of the arrogance of human
reason:
µ Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke, p. x. Cf. Dunn™s partial revocation of this verdict almost
twenty years later in Dunn, “What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John
Locke,” p. .
 God, Locke, and Equality
When truths are once known to us, though by tradition, we are apt to be favorable
to our own parts; and ascribe to our understandings the discovery of what in
reality we borrowed from others . . . A great many things which we have been
bred up in the belief of, from our cradles (and are notions grown familiar, and,
as it were, natural to us, under the gospel), we take for unquestionable obvious
truths, and easily demonstrable; without considering how long we might have
been in doubt or ignorance of them, had revelation been silent. (RC: ±“µ)
It may seem to us now that we can make do with a purely secular notion
of human equality; but as a matter of ethical history, that notion has been
shaped and fashioned on the basis of religion. That is where all the hard
work was done. To drive this point home, Locke introduces a wealth of
imagery, emphasizing the labor that we take for granted as we squander
our ethical inheritance:
Native and original truth is not so easily wrought out of the mine, as we, who have
it delivered already dug and fashioned into our hands, are apt to imagine . . . He
that travels the roads now, applauds his own strength and legs that have carried
him so far in such a scantling of time; and ascribes all to his own vigor; little
considering how much he owes to their pains, who cleared the woods, drained
the bogs, built the bridges, and made the ways passable. (RC: ±° and ±µ)
The defense and elaboration of the principle of human equality, as we
have seen in these chapters, has required no little effort in the way of
bridge-building, wood-clearing, and bog-draining.
Still, at the end of the day, this is at most a genealogical point. It is a
point about how we arrived at the concept of human equality, not a point
about what the concept of human equality now implies or presupposes in
a logical sense. The shape of the concept now may be inexplicable with-
out reference to the religious traditions that fashioned it. But, some will
say, modern egalitarians have simply given the lie to those like Locke
who claim it is impossible to commit oneself to, or work with, or make
great sacri¬ces for, something of this shape without a commitment to
the forces that shaped it.° And maybe that is right. “It is,” as Locke says,
“no diminishing to revelation, that reason [now] gives its suffrage too, to
the truths [that] revelation has discovered” (RC: ±µ).
Whether this concept of human equality, curiously shaped as it is (from
reason™s autonomous point of view), will retain its shape under the various
° I suspect that most of my readers believe that atheists are no more of a menace, probably much
less of a menace, to society than various religious fanatics. Compare the response to Senator
Joseph Lieberman™s claims during the °°° US Presidential Campaign about the sustainability
of public morality in the absence of religious faith. See “Mr. Lieberman™s Religious Words,” The
New York Times, August ±, °°°, p. .

Tolerating Atheists?
pressures it faces, and how haphazardly it will grow once it takes on a
life of its own, is of course another matter. Maybe the concept of equality
will become more humane in various ways, for we have noticed one or
two places in these lectures where Lockean equality seems to have quite
a savage or unpleasant side by virtue of its place in Christian theology.
Or maybe the notion of humans as one another™s equals will begin to fall
apart, under pressure, without the presence of the religious conception
that shaped it. As we have seen, it is a very complex and elaborate idea
and there is no reason to suppose that the complexity of basic human
equality is not matched by its fragility when it “ and we “ are left to our
own devices.
The ¬nal point in this regard that I think Locke would want to insist
on is that equality is not just an idea for the intellectual. It is not an idea
that can do its work on its own or in the academy. It is an idea, Locke
thought, that can be trusted to do its best work in the hands of those who
are its bene¬ciaries “ the plain, unscholastic men and women, “the day-
laborers, the tradesmen, the spinsters and the dairy-maids” (RC: ±) to
whose intelligence the content of the idea plays tribute. Equality cannot
do its work unless it is accepted among those whom it consecrates as
equals. Locke believed this general acceptance was impossible apart from
the principle™s foundation in religious teaching. We believe otherwise.
Locke, I suspect, would have thought we were taking a risk. And I am
afraid it is not entirely clear, given our experience of a world and a
century in which politics and public reason have cut loose from these
foundations, that his cautions and suspicions were unjusti¬ed.
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Index




Note: For John Locke™s views on particular subjects (e.g. absolute monarchy), please refer to the
individual subject headings (e.g. “absolutism” and “monarchy”). Entries listed under “Locke, John”
are limited to Locke™s life and career; his speci¬c works are listed under “Locke™s works.”

apostles, ±°°, ±°“, ±, ±°, ±·
ability, differences in as basis for inequality,
appeal to heaven, , µ“
°“, “µ, µ, ±°, ±±± “±, ±“
appropriation of property, ±µ, ±µ“±, ±·°“·,
abortion, ·n
±µ
Abraham, ±, °
Aquinas, Thomas, ±··n
absolutism, ±, ±, ±“µ°, ±·, ±“, °±
arbitrary power, ±±, ±, ±
abstraction, power of, ·µ“±, , , ±±°“±,
Arendt, Hannah, n, n
±µ, ·
argument, , ±±, ±, °, n, ±“·°, ±·“·,
Ackerman, Bruce, n
±·n
acquisition, see appropriation
Arianism, n
action, ±
Arneson, Richard, n
Adam, ±, ±“±, , “, µ, “µ, n, ±,
Aristippus, ±°
±, ±µ, ±, ±·, ±°, ±, ±°, ±n,
aristocracy, , ±±·, ±“
°, °·n
af¬rmative action, · Aristotle, , ±·, , ±, ±n, ±µ
Arkes, Hadley, n
Africa, ±, °
Ashcraft, Richard, , °n, ±°n, ±°, ±±µ“±,
agent-relativity, ±µ·“
±, ±·, ±µ, ±n, ±, ±·µn, °µn, °,
aggression, ±, ±“, ±, °°“±
±, n, 
agriculture, ±µ“·°, °
Astell, Mary, , µn
AIDS, 
atheism, µ, ± “, , ±µ, ±, “, 
aliens, see foreigners
Audi, Robert, ·n
altruism, ±µ
America, European colonization of, ±µ“·°, Austin, J. L., ·n
authority µ, µ“, ·±, ·, ±°, ±°, ±°, ±·“,
°
±“·
Americans, see native Americans
de facto, °, ±µ“·, °
Anabaptists, °
anachronism, ·“±±, °µ“ see also legitimacy
Ayers, Michael, µ·n, µn
anatomy
angels, n
Anglicanism, ±“°, ± n,  baptism, , µ
animals, “µ, µ“±, , ·°, ·“, ±±“±, basic equality, see equality, basic
±“, ± basic structure, 
anti-semitism, ± belief, religious, ±±, ±°, ± “
apes, °, µ, ±± Bellarmine, Robert Cardinal, ±

µµ
µ Index
coercion, °“±°, ± “
Benn, Stanley, 
Cohen, G. A., ix, ±n, 
Bentham, Jeremy, ±
Coleman, Jules, ix, ·n
Berlin, Isaiah, , ±
Collier, Rebecca, ± “
bestialization of criminals, , ±“·, ±
Colman, John, ±n
Bible, ±, ±“±, “, “°, “µ, ±·“°,
color of skin, 
±“, °
common good, ±, ·
biology, µ°, µ
Blackburn, Simon, n, n commonwealth, see community, political
communism, µ, ±µ“, ±µ
Bodin, Jean, ±
communitarianism, ±µn
Book of Common Prayer, ·
bourgeoisie, µ, ±°µ community
natural, ±µ“, ±µ“, ±
Boyd, Richard, µ·n
political, ±±, ±µn, ±µn, ±“±
Bracken, H. M., n
comprehensive doctrines, µ“·
Brennan, Patrick M., n, ±n, ·n, µn
concept and conceptions, °
Brown, Stuart, ±°n
con¬‚ict, ±µ“, °
Buchanan, Allen, ±°n
Confucius, ±°
burdens of judgment, , 
conjugal rights, 
Burke, Edmund, ±
conjugal society, “°
Burnet, Thomas, µ“, ±±n
Connolly, William E., ·
Butler, Melissa, n, n, “, n, ,
conquest, ·n, ±°, °°“±, °
n
conscience, , ±, ±µ, °n, n, 
consent, ±±“, ±“°, ±, ±·, ±·, ±,
Cain, µ±n, ±n
±µ, ±·, ±, ·; see also tacit consent
Cambridge, ±±, µ°“, ±“, ±
conservatism, ±·“
cannibalism, ±
Constantinople, Mufti of, ±
capital punishment, µ±, ±·, ±µ, ±°
constitution, ±±“±·, ±, ±·, ±°, °, n
capitalism, , ±·
contract, social, , , ±°
Carolinas, slavery in the, °“
contractarianism, ±, ±·, ±, 
Catholicism, Roman, n, ±“, “
contracts, ·, ±, °°“±
censorship, ·
Convention of ±, ±·
charity, ±µ“, ±, ±·°, ±··“·, °
conventions, , µ“·, “, ±·
Charles II, ±, ±·, ±
Coons, John E., n, ±n, ·n, µn
childbirth, , 
Cooper, Anthony Ashley, ±±, °
children, ±, , ·n, , n, ·, °, , ±°,
corporeality, °n, ·±, ±±±
±±°“±, ±± “, ±, ±±, ±, ±n, °±,
corruption, ±±, ±n
°
Chinese, n, ± corruption of the blood, see treason
Coste, Peter, n
Christianity, ±“±, ±µ“±, , ±°, ±°µ“, ±·,
counter-majoritarian institutions, ±± “;
±··, ±°, ±“·, °“±°, ±µ, ±·, ,
“±, ,  see also legislative supremacy
creation, “, µ“, ±µ
church, ± “, °“µ, °, ±“±
criminals, , ±±°, ±± “µ°
Church of England, see Anglicanism
Critical Race Theory, n
Cicero, 
cultivation, ±, ±µ“, ±
civil society, see community, political
culture, ·, ±“·°
Civil War, English, ±·
custody, of children upon divorce, ·
Clark, Lorenne M. G., n, 
customs, “, °, , ±, ±µ, °“
class, “, ±·
clergy, µ, ±°, ±±n, , 
Darwin, Charles, ·
Clinton, Bill, ±·
Davie, George, n
cloning, ·n
µ·
Index
before the law, ±±·“±
day-laborers, , ·“, ±°µn, ±±, ±µ“·, ±,
between the sexes, ± “, ±·
±·“, 
of capacities, , µ, ±±± “±, ±“
death, °°
equal concern and respect, , ±, ±µµ, ±
deism, , n
deliberation, ±“ equal treatment versus treatment as an
equal, , , ±±°n, ±n, ±µ“, ±·
democracy, , ±±, ±·
of opportunity, ±
deontology, ±°, µ
original, ±°, ±·±
dependence, ±
political, ±±“, ±°, ±“
deus ex machina, µ, 
religious foundations of, ±“±µ, “, ± “,
differential rationality, , µ“, ±·“µ
±°±, ±, ±µ, ·, µ“, °
disability, ·n, ±±“±
of resources, , ±µ“
disagreement, ±“
of wealth and income, ±, ±µ“
divine command, ±, µ“, , “·, ±
error, °, , ±±n
divine right of kings, ±·“±, ±“±
essences, real versus nominal, µµ“, ·, ±°,
divine sanctions, ±, ±°“±±, µ, ±

divorce, , ·, ±“
essentialism, “
dolphins, ·°, ±±
ethnic identity, ±
dominion, µ, µn, ±±, ±, , 
Eve, ±, , “, µ, ±, ±
Dred Scott v. Sandford, ±n, n
Exclusion Crisis, ·, ±, ±
Drescher, Seymour, °± “
excommunication, ±
drudgery, , , ±, ±
executive power of the law of nature, ±±, ±µ
Dunn, John, n, ±±n, ±“±, ±µ“±, n, µ“,
n, µ, , ±, ±n, ±“·, ±··n, ±,
fact, as distinguished from value, , ·“,
±·“, °“±°, ±µ“±, , ·“, ,
“·±
±
fairness, ±±
duty, see imperfect duty; natural duty; negative
Fall, the, , µ“, ±“, ±n
and positive duties
Farr, James, ±n, °± “
Dworkin, Ronald, ix, “, , n, °, ±±°n,
fashion, °, ±°, ±
±n, °n
fathers, ±, ·n, n, , “°, ±µ, ±n,
±
ecology, ±
feminism, , , n
education, µ, , ±±±
fetus, , °, µ, ·“
ef¬ciency, economic, 
Filmer, Robert, µ, ±“±, , “, ·“, ,
egalitarianism, see equality
, , ±±, ±, ±µ“, ±·“°, ±“±,
egoism, ±µ·“
±, ±“°°, ±µ, ±·, 
elections, ±±·, ±; see also suffrage
Finnis, John, ±n, ±··n, ·n
Elizabeth I, ·
First Things, ±
England, ±·, ±·µ, ±, “
Fish, Stanley, °n
entitlement, ±··“, ±°, ±, ±µn, °
Fletcher, George P., ix, n, µn
Epistles, the, n, ±, ±n, ±µ“·, °·
force, °“±, ±µ, ±·“, ±±n, °°“±, °, °,
equality, ± “±°, ±µ± “, ±, ±·, ·“, “,
±°“±±, ±, °n, , “; see also

coercion; strength
application of (i.e. equality among whom),
foreigners, ±°, ±µ
“, ±
of authority, ±, “µ, ±°“±°, ±µ“µ forfeiture of rights, see rights, forfeiture of
foundationalism, n, “µ°, ·°, µ, 
based on natural characteristics, , “, ±,
Frankfurt, Harry G., n
, “·±, ±±± “±, ·
freedom, , ±, ±±, ±, ±
basic ± “, , ±, ·“, , , ·°, , µ,
free speech, ±, °“±°, µ
±°, ±µ, ±, ±µ± “, ±·°, , µ, ,
free will, 
°, 
µ Index
Freud, Sigmund,  Hobbes, Thomas, , ±, µ±, ··“, ·“, ±°,
fur trade, ±µ ±±·, ±µµn, ±µ·“, ±·, ±, µ, ·
Hobbism, 
Homer, ±µn
genealogy, “, 
Hooker, Richard, , ±°±n, ±µ“, ±µn
Geneva, ±
Horne, Thomas A., ±··n
geometry, ·“
House of Commons, ±°, ±, ±
Glorious Revolution, ±n
House of Lords, ±°, ±“
God, , µ, , ·“, “, ±, ±µ, ±·“,
±·°“±, ±°, ±, ±, ±µ, ±, °°, ±°“±±, human rights, see rights, human
human species, ±, , ·, , µ, °“, ·°, ·µ,
, µ“, ·“, “°, ± “, °
, ±µ
Adam and Eve, relation to, “·, ±°
Hume, David, n
as creator, ±, µ, ·±, ±
hunting and gathering, ±µ“
existence of, ·“°, , µ, , ±,
husbands, power over wives, , , “°,
“µ, 
µ“, ±°, ±, ±n, ±±, °±, ±·
as lawgiver µ“, ; see also divine
command; divine sanctions; law of nature
political authority, endorsement of, ±µ“· ideas, ±±±
as property-owner, ±±“±, ±, ±“ idle poor, ±, ±, ±“·
idolatry, ±·, ±°
purposes of, ±µ, ±, ±µ
Golden Rule, ±°±, ±µµ“ imago dei (image of God), °n, , µ, ·, ·± “,
Gooding-Williams, Robert, ix, n ±n, ±, , °
Good Samaritan, parable of the, n, ° imperfect duty, ±°n
Gorr, Michael, ·n inclinations, natural, ±°“±
individualism, moral, °, ±µ
Gospels, n, ±°±, ±°µ, ±“, °“·, °, ±±,
 individuals, µ
government, origin of,  industry, ±, ±·“, 
Grant, Ruth, µ°n, µn, n, ·n, ·µn inegalitarianism, particular versus general,
“Great Chain of Being,” µ“ ±·“±, 
inequality, economic, ±µ± “, ±·, ±·“·, ±
Greek philosophy, ±°°, , , 
infanticide, ±
Greenawalt, Kent, ix, ·n
inheritance, ±, ±n, ±µ, ±n, ±“±
Grotius, Hugo, ±, °
innate ideas, µ±, ·, ±, ±°“±, ±
insanity, ·, ±°
Haksar, Vinit, n
intellectuals, “
Hare, R. M., ·n, n
interpretation, ±± “±, ·, ±±n, ±± “, ±, 
harm, “·
intuitions, ±±, ±µ, °“±
Harris, Angela P., n
Harris, Ian, ·n, µ±n, ±°± “, ±±±n, ±µµn, ±µn, Islam, see Muslims
Israel, ±, ±°n, ±, ±, °±, °·n, ±°, °
±n
Hart, H. L. A., ·µn
Japanese, n
heathens, see pagan religion
James II, ±, ±·, ±·, ±, ±, ±
Hebrew Scriptures, see Old Testament
Jephtha, µn
hereditary principle, ±±·, ±“±, ±·
Jesus Christ, ±, ±n, ±°°“±, ±°“, ±°, ±± “,
heretics, ±
±, ±, ±, ±, °·“±±, ±µ
hermeneutics, “±°, ±°“
Jews, ±°n, ±, ±µ“, ±, ±, °, °
Herzog, Don, n
Judeo-Christian heritage, °“±
Hindus, ±°
judiciary, ±, ±
historical context, “±
just war, , ±°, ±·, °°“±, °
history of ideas, ·“±, , ±, ±±µ“±, ±°“±,
justice, , ±±±, ±·“°, , °
±“, °µ, °“±
µ
Index
Kant, Immanuel, µ, ±°n, ±µµ“, °·n ¬‚ight from England (±), °µ
Kato, Takshi, n integrity, issue of, °“
Kendall, Willmoore, ±n last will and testament of, ±n
political views of, ±·“
kings, ±°“, ±, ±, ±“±, ±“µ°, ±n,
°±, ± politics, involvement in, ±±µ“
Kitcher, Philip, ix, µ°n as portrayed in literature, ± “
Kramer, Matthew, “·±, ±µn poverty, personal attitude towards, ±“·
power, attraction to, °µ
radicalism of, ±°, ±±, ±
labor, , , , ±±±, ±µ, ±“, ±·, ±, 
duty to, , ±“, ±, ±“· relation between Essay and Two Treatises,
µ°“, , ±°“±
forced, °°
Roman Catholicism, personal view of, °,
mixing of, ±, ±µ“, ±“
n
theory of value, ±“, ±·“µ, ±··
silence of, on various topics, n, ±, n
laborers, see day-laborers; working class
slave trade, involvement with, ±±µ, ±·,
land, ±, ±·“, ±·µ, ±, ±
°“
landlords, ±±n
Socinianism, question of Locke™s, ·, ±°°,
language, µµ, µ·, °, ±
±µ, n
Laslett, Peter, ±±, µ°“±, , µ, ±n, ±n,
unmarried, 
±°“±, ±·, ±°
women™s preaching, experience of, ± “
law of nature, µ, “, µ“·, ±°°, ±°, ±°µ,
±±±, ±°“±, ±± “, ±, ±µ± “, ±, ±·“, Locke™s works
A Letter Concerning Toleration, ±, ·n, ±, n,
±“, ±, °“·, ±±, ±·, µ, 
°n, ·, ±·“, ±±, ±, ±, °,
law, positive, ±, “, ·, ·, ±±, ±“µ, ±,
°“±µ, ±“, “
±“µ°, ±°, °·n, , 
A Second Letter Concerning Toleration, ±°, ±±n,
lawyers, ±, ±·
±“°
learning, °“, ±°, ±
A Third Letter for Toleration, ·, ±n, ±·,
Lee v. Weisman, n
±°“±±, ±“°, n, , 
legislative supremacy, ±±, ±± “
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ±,
legislature, ±±“, ±, ±±
±, ±, n, ·, “, ·“°, , “,
legitimacy, n, ±±, ±°, ±·, ±“, °
±, ±µµ, ±±, ±, ±, ±·, °·, “µ,
Leibniz, Gottfried, µ±
“·, 
leisure, , , ±°, ±°µ
“An Essay on the Poor Law,” ±“·
Levellers, , ±°n, ±·n
“An Essay on Toleration,” 
liberalism ± “, ±µ, ±·, µ“, °“±
Essays on the Law of Nature, n, ±n, ±,
libertarianism, ±°
°
license (as opposed to liberty), ±
“First Tract on Government,” ±µn, °µn
Lieberman, Joseph, n
“Homo ante et post Lapsum,” µn, n
Linnaeus, Karl, ·, µn
“Law,” ±
Livy, Titus, ±n
“Liberty of the Press,” ±
Lloyd Thomas, D. A., , ·
“Of Ethic in General,” 
Lochner v. New York, n
On the Conduct of the Understanding, ·, n
Locke, John
Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of Paul, ±,
America, interests in, ±µ, ±·, °“
·, , , ± “, °, ·±, ±± “, ±µ“
attitude to customs of his day, ±, °“
“Second Tract on Government,” ±, °µn
character of, ± “
Some Thoughts Concerning Education, ±, ±±±,
Christology, interest in, ±µ
±±n, ±µn
consistency, “·, °, µ, , ±±µ, ±, ±°“±
date of composition of main works, ·n “The Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina,” °“µ
early writings, ±n
° Index
mental capacity, differences in, µ, ·“, “
Locke™s works (cont.)
merit, µ, ±“
The Reasonableness of Christianity, ±, ±, “·,
Mill, John Stuart, ±n, 
“·, “±°, ±, ±± “, ±“, ±± “,
Milton, John, ±
±“µ, °·“, ±±, ±µ, µ, °“±, ,
Milton, J. R., °n
± “
ministry, by women, ± “
Two Treatises of Government, ±, ·n, , ±± “±,
miracles, ±°
±“±·, , , ±±µ, ±“, ±“±, ±,
mixed government, ±, ±·
±, °“±±, ±, ±µ
Molina, Luis de, ±
First Treatise, “, ±“±, “, µ, µ“,
monarchy, n, ±±·, ±, ±, ±·, ±
°“±, ±, ±µ“, ±µ“, ±“,
money, ±·°“, ±·“·, ±, °
±··“±, ±“±, ±
monotheism, “±
Second Treatise, ±, , , µ, µ, ±°±,
Moore, J. T., ±°n
±°“, ±“°, ±µ± “··, ±, °, °·,
moral expertise, “±°, ±
±± “±
moral personality, ·, ··, “°
“Verses on Queen Catherine,” n
moral philosophy, ±°°“, ±±
“Virtue B,” n
morality, ·, ·“, “±°·, ±, ±
logic, “
demonstrability of, “, ±°µ, °·
Louis XIV, King of France, ±
enforcement of, ±, °, µ
Lovejoy, Arthur, µ“
religious foundation of, “, ±
Lutheranism, ±
mortality, ·
lying, ±
Mosaic law, ±, ±, ±°n
mothers, , “°, ±, ±, ±·
Macdonald, Margaret, n
Muslims, ±°, °“±, “°
Macintyre, Alasdair, ±n, , 
Macpherson, C. B., n, µ“, ±°“, ±,
Nabulsi, Karma, ix, °µ
±, ±·°“, ±·“·, ±n
Nagel, Thomas, ix, ·n
magistrates, ±±°, ±“, °, ±°“±±, “µ
Narveson, Jan, n
majority decision, ±, ±±, ±“
native Americans, ±, ±µ, ±, ±µ, ±“·°,
majority, tyranny of, ±±; see also
±·µ, °
counter-majoritarian institutions
natural duty, ±±, ±µµ“, °°
“man,” gender of the word, µ, µ, ·, ±
natural kinds, µ°, 
market, ±, ±·, ±
marriage, , , ·, ±“µ, · natural law, see law of nature
Marshall, John, ix, n, ±°°n, ±±±n, ±, ±µn, natural rights, see rights, natural
naturalistic fallacy, “·±
±, ±n, n

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