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List of Figures
Appendix: Canonical Models of Theories of Contract
Figure 1A.1: omparative efficiency of the three governance structures
Chapter 3: Contract and Economic Organization
Figure 3.1: ncentive intensity and administrative controls
Chapter 13: Complexity and Contract
Figure 13.1: Time line for agency relationship
Figure 13.2: Time line for hold-up problem
Figure 13.3: Time line for authority relationship
Figure 13.4: Time line for ex post hold-up
Chapter 14: Authority, as Flexibility, is at the Core of Labor
Contracts
Figure 14.1: Highway construction
Figure 14.2: Simon's model
Chapter 15: Positive Agency Theory-Place and Contributions
Figure 15.1: The building blocks of PAT source: (Jensen, 1998, p. 3)
Chapter 21: Licensing in the Chemical Industry
Figure 21.1: Who was licensing chemical technologies, 1980s (percent)
Figure 21.2: Market for chemical technology as a function of investor's type (percent)
Figure 21.3: Share of SEFs licensing, by size of product markets (percent)
Figure 21.4: Market share of SEFs and licensing, by chemical producers (percent)
Figure 21.5: Product differentiation and licensing
Chapter 25: Institutional or Structural-Lessons from
International Electricity Sector Reforms
Figure 25.1: US retail electricity rates, 1990-1999 Note: Price is calculated as average
revenue per kWh. Source: US Energy Information Administration.
Figure 25.2: Unit spot price, California wholesale market, January 1999-November
2000
Figure 25.3: Unit spot price, El Salvador wholesale market, January 1998-May 2000
Chapter 26: Electricity Sector Restructuring and
Competition-A Transactions-Cost Perspective
Figure 26.1: Competitive wholesale and retail markets
List of Tables
Chapter 1: The Economics of Contracts and The Renewal of
Economics
Table 1.1: Schematic representation of the different approaches
Appendix: Canonical Models of Theories of Contract
Table 1A.1: Efficiency under different property-rights allocations
Chapter 5: Entrepreneurship, Transaction-Cost Economics,
and The Design of Contracts
Table 5.1: A comparison of models
Chapter 13: Complexity and Contract
Table 13.1: Cost of a complete state-contingent contract
Table 13.2: Contract payoffs
Chapter 15: Positive Agency Theory-Place and Contributions
Table 15.1: PAT versus TCT: a revised comparative assessment
Chapter 17: Experiments on Moral Hazard and Incentives-
Reciprocity and Surplus-Sharing
Table 17.1: Parameters of the experiment by Keser and Willinger (2000)
Table 17.2: Activity costs in the experiments by Keser and Willinger (2001)
Chapter 19: The Quasi-Judicial Role of Large Retailers-An
Efficiency Hypothesis of their Relation with Suppliers
Table 19.1: Average profit margin as a function of credit and payment periods in EU
countries
Table 19.2: Correlation coefficients between country averages of credit and payment
periods and causes of late payment in domestic transactions
Table 19.3: Average payment periods, average delays, and economic development
Chapter 21: Licensing in the Chemical Industry
Table 21.1: Licensing strategies by some selected chemical producers
Chapter 24: Contractual Choice and Performance-The Case
of Water Supply in France
Table 24.1: Permanent average population, by type of arrangement
Table 24.2: Distribution of contractual arrangements, by regional agencies
Table 24.3: Variables and their meaning
Table 24.4: Determinants of contractual choice
Table 24.5: Modes of organization and performance
Chapter 25: Institutional or Structural-Lessons from
International Electricity Sector Reforms
Table 25.1: Organizational and ownership structure of competitive wholesale electricity
markets
List of Examples and Propositions
Chapter 12: Allocating Decision Rights Under Liquidity
Constraints
Proposition 1
Example 1
Example 2
Example 3
Proposition 2
Example 2: (contd.)
Example 4
Chapter 13: Complexity and Contract
Proposition 1
Proposition 2
Proposition 3
Proposition 4
Chapter 24: Contractual Choice and Performance-The Case
of Water Supply in France
Proposition 1
Proposition 2
Proposition 3

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